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In all the big industrial countries,  the increase 
in collective needs is one o£  the major lines o£  force 
in economic  development over recent years. 
Although the reality o£  this phenomenon  is 
incontestable,  the expression "  collective needs  "  seems 
hazy even ambiguous  and in our introduction to this report 
we  must  try to outline the area we  are considering within 
the economic,  social and political context o£ European 
society today. 
Implicit in the title o£  our report is a  necessary 
definition o£ collective needs  as  opposed to private needs. 
This contradistinction seems  to have asserted itself over 
the last decade  and is taking its place with the basic 
truths,  which  shape collective attitudes. 
Now  this contrasted image  o£  man's needs  tends to 
mask  the complementary aspects or more  precisely the 
interdependance between the particular needs  o£ the indi-
vidual and  those which match up  with the common  aspira-
tions o£  a  whole  society or a  group  o£  individuals.  It 
seems  necessary to stress the £act,  that private needs 
and collective needs reciprocally provoke each others 
appearance  and desire £or satisfaction. 
The  spread o£  the motor car,  generating a  -collective 
pressure on the development of highway infrastructure, iSo/  ~ 
obviously highly characteristic o£  this interdependence 
of the two  types o£  need.  Opposite processes although less -2-
discernible are none  the less just as precise.  As  an example, 
the rapid rise in the  general  level of instruction over the 
last twenty years is a  phenomenon,  which can be regarded as 
a  part of the domain  of collective needs.  It has  inspired 
a  flourishing demand  for cultural  goods  and services,  a  type 
o£ need,  whichn  as we  see it, cannot be  assimilated with a 
collective need and which derives more  from  an original and 
personalized need by the individual. 
It thus  seems,  that the concept of a  dichotomus 
structure of needs  cannot  be  retained as  a  basic characte-
ristisch;  on the contrary,  the phenomenon  of the  evolution 
of collective needs is complex  and cannot  be  analysed in 
isolation. 
As  a  corollary to the contrast generally allowed 
between collective and private needs,  a  distinction has been 
made  between needs  expressed and satisfied by the market  and 
those which miss  the play of the market  and depend for 
their satisfaction largely on  the efforts and  responsability 
of the public authorities by means  of total or partial 
financing out of public funds. 
This distinction is to  som  extent  a  real one;  the 
market  economy  system,  such as we  see working in Europe  (or 
the u.s.A.)  is not slanted towards  the  satisfaction of 
collective needs.  Some  collective needs  are inadequately 
expressed by the market  and private enterprise faced with a 
mandate for profitability is focussed on the  solvent needs 
of the consumer,  such as  they appear,  effectively or poten-
tially,  through the market. 
However,  we  think it necessary to underline the limits 
of this distinction between private and collective needs. 
First of all,  from  the  standpoint under discussion, 
the situation in each of the different Mamber  States of the 
EEC  is not exactly the  same  :  some  kinds of need satisfied 
in one  country by definitive action on the part of the public 
authorities,  are met  in another essentially by private 
initiative or by  a  mixed recipe between the public  and 
private sectors;  there is therefore no  rigid rule. -3-
Even  if we  leave  aside  the  sharpest  contrasts,  we 
can  still  see  in  the  case  of  some  prime  collective  needs, 
very  deep-seated  differences  in  terms  of  the  role  of  the 
public  authorities.  The  solutions  adopted  in  Great  Britain 
and  France  concerning  health  are  not  comparable.  The  National 
Health  Service  in  England  is  entirely  financed  by  the  State 
budget  and  supplies  free  services  for  the  whole  population. 
The  system  of  Social  Security  in  France,  which  does  not 
exclude  private  medicine  is  fed  by  subscriptions  from 
employers  and  insurees  and  in  a  small  way  by  the  State.  In 
many  cases,  its  services  are  neither  entirely  free  nor  paid 
directly  by  the  Funds  (Caisses)  of  this  organization.  The 
table  below  points  up  the  diversities  between  the  six 
EEC  countries. 
Subscriptions 
Country  Insurees  Employers 
Belgium  23 
Germany  29 
France  22 
Italy  14 
Luxembourg  20 
Netherlands  37 
23 
31 
22 
17 
23 
39 
51 
53 
70 
73 
48 
44 
50 
49 
69 
66 
40 
46 
Share 
of  the  pu-
blic  autho 
rities 
20 
15 
7 
8 
22 
9 
22 
17 
7 
11 
28 
6 
6 
3 
1 
5 
10 
10 
Miscel-
laneous 
5 
3 
2 
6 
9 
9 
Elsewhere,  in  areas  where  public  funds  ensure  total 
financial  support,  in  some  collective  installations  for 
example,  we  can  note  according  to  the  country  that  the -4-
responsability for decisions  and the management  of budgets 
are found at more  or less centralised levels.  In this respect, 
the  importance o£  the part played by local administrations  in 
Federal  Germany  contrasts with the highly centralised system 
in France.  As  we  see it  this is not  a  simple  administrative 
variation,  but a  difference in the actual expression o£ 
collective needs  and the means  of satisfying them  :  within 
the compass  of the German  administrative organization,  the 
needs  £or aollective installations are  grasped much  more 
directly and responsability is carried out in a  less diffused 
way  than in the  French system. 
Some  aims,  relatively recent,  but which are making 
themselves felt in the mass  of European society are broadly 
out of line with a  definition of collective needs based on 
the criterium of public initiative and finance.  We  are thinking 
here for  example  of the re-evaluation of manual  work  in 
industry or in more  general  terms,  the development of men  in 
the big companies.  Here it is obvious  that the  joint respon-
sabilities of all the social partners are on trial and at 
the  top of the list the responsibilities o£  those running 
the business. 
Although it seems  acceptable to maintain pragmatically 
a  distinction between collective and private needs based on 
the fact that the satisfaction of collective needs misses  the 
play of the market  and often involves public finance  total or 
partial, we  must  stress that this is a  convention,  which does 
not fit closely with reality and which  masks  divergent 
conditions. 
Moreover,  the motive idea behind thinking for the 
future,  is, in our opinion,  that of constant change  in 
collective needs,  which bars  any rigid and static definition. -5-
We  want  to stress here  ~hat the  substance  of collective 
needs is closel7 tied to the -level  of development  o~ a 
society and  from  a  twofold  standpoint. 
Firstly,  economic  development is accompanied  by  a 
continual extensioz of the  specific collective needs 
o~ industrial and  urban civilization,  from  the  basic 
infrastructures as far as  preservation of the  environment. 
Seconll7,  in parallel with the  progress  of economic 
development,  the  overall rise in the  standard  of living 
modifies what  may  be  called the  "system of values"  of 
a  society.  This basic  phemameuon  transforae  ~e range 
of collective needs  :  new  needs appears,  others lose 
their edge.  As  an  example,  the  sympathy  expressed 
towards  the  most  undertavoured,  or in more  general 
terms the  quest for less inequality of opportunity 
has materialized as a  collective need  of advanced 
societies,  in proportion to the  rise in the  standard 
of living. 
!hese general remarks  on  the  evolution and 
complexities  of the  concept  of collective needs 
lead us to limit our analysis to the  current situation 
and  to explore  the  relatively near future i.e. ten 
to fifteen years ahead,  whilst taking care not to 
suggest rigid solutions,  in the  light of todays 
problems,  which would  mortgage  the  future. 
++++++++ -6-
SOME  BASIC  HYPOTHESES 
The  evolution of collective needs  and  "future  options" 
can  only  be  studied within  some  basic hypotheses  relative 
to  the  main  trends  of economic  development  in European 
society. 
The  first  of these  hypotheses  concerns maintaining 
an  objective  of relatively rapid  growth,  this being 
considered  as  a  preferential means  of ensuring the  rise 
in the  standard  of living. 
We  are  not excluding the  fact,  that the  system  of 
values underlying this objective  of rapid  economic  growth 
namely  dynamism,  technical progress,  creation of wealth 
etc.  will fade  out  in time.  But  this alternative does 
not  seem  to have  to be  retained  on  the  horizon  ten years 
hence.  This  being the  case  we  shall strongly underline 
the  fact,  that  the  problems  raised  as  the  penalties of 
growth now  and  henceforward,  and  this discussion proves it, 
will progressively blur the  very rhythm  of growth.  Again 
the  current  measuring instruments  for economic  growth will 
become  less  and  less adequate  and  in this  respect very 
great attention must  be  paid  to the  efforts now  under way 
in various  countries and  at Community  level to rejuvenate 
the  concepts  of National Exchequer  :  behind  a  question  of 
technique  there  lies in reality an ethical problem,  which 
can  be  summarized  in a  basic  question  :  how  do  we  quantify 
social progress  ? 
In full knowledge  of the  inadequacy  of our measuring 
instruments  and  their total incapacity of grasping the 
negative  effects  of growth,  it ie worth while  recalling 
some  of the  proportions  of economic  development  since -7-
the  development  of the  Common  Market.  Over  the  years 
1968  - 1969  the  growth in the  gross national product 
for the  whole  is at  a  rate  of 70 %,  which  corresponds 
to about  55  % per head  of population;  over the  same 
period  private  consumption  swelled  by more  than  65  %, 
more  than  50 % per head. 
In the  hypothesis which we  are  following,  namely 
pursuit  of rapid  economic  growth which will have  to be 
gauged  by  completely modernized  instruments,  we  must 
stress the  permanence  of the  needs  of private  consumption. 
As  an  example,  let us  recall the  prospects  offered  by 
the  efforts in France  at  the  time  of preparation df 
the  Sixth Plan  and  review its most  characteristic 
features. 
Over  a  period  of twenty years  from  1965  - 1985,  the 
basic hypothesis is for a  rate  of annual  growth in 
expenditure  on  private  consumption  of 5 %,  about  1/2% 
below the  growth rate  for the  gross  internal product, 
which means  that this expenditure  is multiplied  by 2.6. 
In this aggregate  the  share  of foodstuff expenditure 
decreases  appreciably with,  however,  a  relative  increase 
in  "quality"  or speciality products  :  the  co-efficient 
of multiplication for the  period 1965- 1975  is 1.58. 
Among  the non-foodstuff items  of  consumption,  the 
weakest  factor  of growth is in clothing with  a  co-efficient 
of multiplication of 2.4. 
Housing  and  household  equipment  expenditure  rise  more 
rapidly than  the  average,  multi~lying by  2.9. -8-
The  growth in cultural and  leisure  expenditure is 
also  above  the  average  - multiplied  by ,.5. 
May  we  point  out  that in certain sectors,  where  the 
satisfaction of needs  involves  a  mixture  of private  and 
public finance,  high growth rates are  found. 
This is so for expenditure  on  hygiene  and  health, 
where  the  co-efficient  of multiplication  for  1965  - 1985 
is 4.8  and  also true  for transport  and  telecommunications 
with a  co-efficient  of 4.7. 
A second hypothesis  concerns  continuing m9vement  in 
industrialization.  We  think,  that in all Member  States 
of the  Community,  industrialization policy will always 
be  relatively prominent. 
Here  we  should recall briefly the  role  of industry 
in social and  economic  development.  Industrialization is 
not  an  end  in itself but  a  means  of attaining a  certain 
number  of economic,  social and  political objectives. 
Tt is mainly via industry that present  day  advances 
embodied  in the  development  of science  and  technique 
emerge  as  economic  progress.  Another  point is that the 
industry of each European  country is exposed  to international 
competition.  The  interplay of these  two  factors  over all 
industrial activity exerts  a  constant pressure  expressed 
by marked  progress  in productivity and  by  a  relatively 
moderate  evolution  of prices. 
We  may  also note  that the  share  of public  receipts 
coming  in from  industry is higher than  the  share  of 
industry in the  national product. -9-
Industrial development  can  thus  contribute in 
releasing additional financial means  to meet  collective 
needs,  quite  apart  from  any  increase  in global fiscal 
pressure. 
We  must  also stress the  decisive  role  played  by 
industry in attenuating disparities between  regions  and 
in generating opportunities for employment  in response 
to the  demands  of competitivity. 
Faced with an  objective  of economic  and  social 
progress,  we  do  not feel that there  are  any alternatives. 
Industrial development  is the  only way.  The  problem is to 
channel this development  so  that it will be  more  closely 
adapted  to the  deeply felt hopes  of today's  society and 
enable  us  to preserve  the  framework  of life and  the natural 
wealth of tomorrow's  society. 
Our  third hypothesis  concerns  the  basis  of the 
economic  system of Europe  as  a  whole. 
We  shall look at this situation within the  framework 
of~maintaining the  present  competitive  economic  system. 
We  want  to stress here  that the  control of competition is 
inseparable  from  the  proper procedures  of a  market 
economy.  If competition is to remain  as  the  open  rivalry, 
which is an irreplaceable factor in emulation and  progress 
,xperience constantly shows  anarchy in competition  can 
eventually destroy wealth and  generate  social and  political 
unrest both within and  between  states.  We  must  therefore 
emphasize  the  importance  of the  probiems  involved in the 
control  of competition at the  overall European level. -10-
Beside  these  general hypotheses,  which try to place 
within  a  firm outline  the  problems  posed  by  the  rise in 
collective needs,  it seems  to us  that  the  "future  options" 
can  only  ve  defined  under certain constraints  of economic 
development  and  that  they  should  respect  two  particular 
requirements. 
The  first is to reject  any  formula  which heightens 
the  factors  of inflation.  We  mean  here  that it does  not 
seem  acceptable  to  suggest  choices,  which will implici  t·ly 
involve  acceptance  of a  chronic  policy  of budgetary 
deficits for the  sake  of financing  collective  and  social 
installations or transfer expenditure. 
The  second  constraint  concerns  the  level of overall 
fiscal pressure.  In our view,  to heighten fiscal 
pressure,  as  a  means  of expanding financial  resources 
for  the  satisfaction of collective needs,  is a  solution 
likely in  the  medium  term to be  largely ineffective. 
Certainly in the  short  term  the  heightening of fiscal 
pressure  can  release  additional resources  to finance 
installation,  running  and  transfer expenditure.  However, 
experience  proves,  that  beyond  a  certain threshold 
level,  which has nearly been  reached  today in most 
European  countries,  fiscal  pressure  dampens  the  initiative 
behind  the  dynamism  of  the  economy  or leads  to fraudulent 
action,  which it is difficult to  combat  effectively. 
As  a  constraint,  we  shall establish then  that  the 
overall fiscal pressure  be  maintained  at  a  level near 
today's,  stressing that this in no  way  precludes 
internal adjustments  in the  various  types  of taxation 
in proportion to  the  objectives to  be  attained for  a -11-
fuller satisfaction of certain collective needs.  These 
adjustments bring in political choices;  these will have 
to be  made  within the  range  of a  necessary reconciliation 
of taxation systems  between  the  Member  States  of the  EEC. 
It therefore  seems  desirable  that  the  next  medium 
term  programme  of the  Co~munity should  include  some  mutual 
~eliberations on  the  distribution of fiscal levies  and 
the  part  they might  play in the  satisfaction of collective 
needs.  Such mutual  thinking would  allow comparison  of 
exp~rience between  each country  and  the  formulation  of 
som  common  guidelines. 
To  complete  this rapid  analysis  of  our hypotheses, 
representing the  outline  of our study,  we  will emphasize 
one  central idea  :  the  continuation of European 
construction  .. 
In this respect  we  think that European  construction 
pre-supposes  some  agreement  with the  preceding theories. 
This  point  certainly deserves  thorough  consideration and 
it must  be  quite  clear that  the  different individual 
nature  of each  country facing  the  problems  in question 
represents  a  source  of mutual  enrichment.  However,  it is 
difficult to  conceive  or imagine  progress  in European 
unity if serious divergences  appear in the  economic 
system in question  or in industrialization policy, if 
the  harmonization  of the  various  taxation  systems  runs 
up  against generally irreconcilable  conditions,  and if 
there  does  not exist  a  certain identity of attitude  towards 
the  problem  of inflation. 
Therefore  in keeping with the  hypothesis  of 
continu-ing progres  towards European unity,  we  shall 
emphasize  the  fact  that exchanges  between  members  of -12-
the  Common  Market will extend  to new  areas  and  involve 
not  only capital but  also men.  In this respect  the 
next  medium  term policy programme  of the  Community 
should  give  preferential treatment to the  study  of 
problems  posed  by  the  rise  in collective needs,  a 
study which  we  see  in terms  of a  detailed  comparison 
of the  existing conditions in the  different Member 
States.  This  supposes  that specific studies will be 
implemented  and  developed,  which will  overload  the 
staff of the  National Exchequer,  which is not  prepared 
for the  problems  in question. 
This  conference  forms  the  point  of departure  for 
this thought  which  cannot  help but  crystallize  around 
a  central  option  :  of guiding economic  development 
towards  a  fuller satisfaction of collective needs. 
For  convenience  of analysis,  we  retain as  collective 
needs,  those  whose  satisfaction misses  the  play of 
supply  and  demand  on  the  market  and  involves  in many 
cases  total or partial public  financing  and  we  shall 
try to bring out  some  of the  lines  of force  in the 
present  situation and  anticipated  developments 
within ten  to fifteen years. 
In  the  immense  range  of collective needs,  as 
understood today,  we  can distinguish several categories 
of needs  with appreciably different development. 
+++++++ -13-
THE  PERMANENCE  OF  TRADITIONAL  COLLECTIVE  NEEDS 
A first category concerns  the  traditional collective 
needs,  characteristic of any  organized  society  :  national 
defence,  public  law and  order,  safety of the  citizen, 
justice  ••• 
In this field  development  is closely bound  up with 
the  society's system of values,  whose  importance  we 
stressed earlier.  As  an example,  the  problem of law and 
order and  repressive  justice during recent times has 
assumed  new  dimensions,  which reflect the  changes  in 
the  collective conscience  of society. 
The  political choices made  in certain sectors,  such 
as National Defense  have  obviously had  very direct 
economic  consequences. 
However  we  will not  deal  +.here  with this portion of 
collective needs,  which  concerns  the  sphere  of politics 
and  ethice.  We  shall simply underline  the  permanence  of 
these  needs  :  defense,  law and  order,  safety are all 
inherent in any  form  of social life anywhere,  at any  •  time  and  the nature  of the  substance  of these  needs 
changes  in relation to the  moral,  social and  political 
context.  It is quite  clear,  that options  taken  regarding 
this class ot collective needs will make  a  decisive 
contribution to shaping European  society. 
THE  OUTLINE  OF  LI~E IN  INDUSTRIAL  AND  URBAN  SOCIETY 
A second  category of collective needs  covers  those 
which are  bred  from  the  increasingly rapid  technicological 
changes  and  by industrial and  urban  society. -14-
Here  we  are  dealing with infrastructure  of all 
kinds  mainly transport  and  telecommunications;  urban 
developments  and  localization of workplaces;  regional 
balance;  the  campaign  against  the  harmful effects 
generated  by  industrial production  and  consumption; 
the  protection of the  environment  and  our cultural 
and  artistic heritage. 
This mass  of collective needs  involved in the 
development  of industrial and  urban society corresponds 
with a  range  of new  scarcities and  shortages more  or 
less acute  according to the  sector or country.  Analysis 
of this evolution shows  a  distinct degradation of life 
there with an  interplay of the  coats and  negative effects 
of concentration and  technical progress,  namely  pollution, 
noise,  destruction of sites,  increased  time  and  expense 
in getting from  home  to work. 
The  policy on  regional balance  and  the  problems 
set by  the  protection of the  environment,  the 
preservation of natural wealth and  the  campaign 
against industrial "nuisance"  are  the  subjects  of 
special reports.  It is not  our place  to tackle  these 
matters in depth.  We  would  like to make  a  general 
remark,  how~ver,  regarding the  problem of pollution 
and  industrial nuisance.  The  necessary reforms  in 
present  conditions,  which will inevitably involve 
financial burdens  on  businesses,  will be  all the  more 
rapidly made,  if international agreements either 
comprehensive  or at  the  level of the  main  lines of 
activity,  equate  the  obligations of enterprises. 
The  co-ordination of the  Community  programme  of policies -15-
for  the  protection of the natural environment is 
absolutely necessary to  avoid distortions of competition. 
Such  a  co-ordination can  and  must  be  an  aspect  of 
rapid  and  decisive  progress. 
Without  tackling the  specific study of levelopment 
of transport,  telecommunication  and  urban  construction 
needs,  which special reports  are  dealing with,  we  arrive 
at  ..  an  enquiry into the  mechanisms  for the  expression of 
demand  and  the  adjustment  of supply to demand. 
~ifhether 1 t  concerns  transport,  telecommunication 
or urban development  demand  is only too  often expressed 
by  serious  shortage  :  so for instance  the  problem of 
urban  development  occurs  today in the  form  of sorting 
out  the  congestion in the  towns.  The  collective 
awareness  of the  degradation  of life in urban society 
is displayed  by  pressure  of public  opinion,  combining 
often contradietory desires  and  generally expressed 
with no  consideration of costs.  The  system of 
financing  by means  of taxation on  investments  and 
public services,  in the  eyes  of those  who  benefit, 
breaks  the  link between satisfaction and  cost.  In 
many  areas the  strength of the  need  hinges  on  the 
low  or non-existent price,  a  concept  which leads to 
distortion of  judgement  at both the  public authority 
and  consumer level and  extends  the  range  of needs 
ad  infinitum. 
As  far as  supply born by  the  public authorities 
is concerned,  one  must first of all take  note  of the 
inelasticity of resources  in relation to  demand. 
Furthermore  supply in terms  of investments  or public 
services  covers either State monopolies  or activities 
largely shielded  from  competition. -16-
Because  of this,  arbitrations,  already difficult  in 
themselves,  escape  the  constraints  of profitability 
and nanagement  as  a  result  of even  the  smallest  charge 
imposed  on  them  by proper  action of competition. 
Several  lines of research may  lead  to  an 
improvement  in the  mechanisms  for  adapting  supply  to 
demand  in  the  field of collective  needs  which  we 
defined earlier. 
On  the  plane  of  demand,  it seems  necessary first 
to  re-establish the  factors  of choice  between  the 
satisfaction of different  needs  :  choice  between 
collective  and private needs  and  choice  between  the 
various  collective ones.  This  pre-supposes  an  effort 
towards  clarification on  the  plane  of costs  and  prices 
coupled with  a  real publicity campaign with  regard  to 
public  opinion.  The  campaign  should be  backed  by  an 
effort  to  sensitize  opinion  towards  tomorrow's  problems. 
We  think,  that  studies  on  long  term  outlooks  could  be 
impl~mented mainly within  the  compass  of  the  EEC  to 
explore  a  wide  gamut  of possible  future  concepts, 
including by  all means  even  "wildly  inacceptable 
scenarios".  The  objective here  is  to  provoke  collective 
awareness,  up  to  now  scrappy  and  blurred,  of how  much 
is at  stake  and  to  stimulate  everyone's  sense  of 
responsability. 
Moreover,  structures  should  be  sought which will 
allow  comparison of the  different  aims.  Consumer 
associations  can play  an  important  part here,  but  local 
administrative authorities  can  also  be  considered  as 
a  standard vehicle  for  the  expression of  demand  by 
collective  installations  and  can  link  the  dialogue 
between opinion  and  the  public authorities.  Arbitrations 
(and management)  would,  according  to  cases,  have  to  be 
made  at  a  more  or  less  decentralized level. -17-
Let  us  stress here  that  the  rise  in collective needs  is 
in itself a  factor particularly encouraging  to  this 
dialogue,  which moreover  is  in parallel with aspirations, 
which  though still vague  are  making  themselves  felt, 
towards  the  participation of the  citizen in the  life 
of the  city. 
Concerning  supply,  there  seems  to be  a  need  for 
recreating,  in certain spheres,  an  atmosphere  of 
competition  and  rivalry.  This  means  that we  must  question 
again the  gratuitousness  or  low  price of  some  of  the 
services  as  a  result  of public  responsability and 
finance.  In this  respect  experiments  currently running 
•  •  in certain areas,  such  as  the motorways,  should be 
extended  to  other activities  as  for  example 
telecommunications.  The  point  is  to  release  the  State 
from  certain tasks  so  that it may  devote  itself to  new 
needs  and  at  the  same  time  to  submit  new  branches  of 
production  to  the  pressure  of  the  market  and  also 
particularize  some  of  the  collective expenditure,  even 
if it means  subsidining directly the most  underfav~ured 
categories  of  consumer. 
As  regards  the  important  problem  of public works 
contracts,  the  situation should  be  evaluated 
realistically.  Due  to  the  local nature  of work  sites, 
international  competition can exist  only beyond  a 
certain level,  since  the  contracts  of  a  lower  value 
can  interest only  the  enterprises  in a  favourable 
geographical  situation.  Harmonization  at  Community  level 
in  awarding  contracts  has  therefore  economic  meaning 
only if competition  can work  effectively.  Publicity 
attached  to  the  calls  for  tender  can  encourage  this 
competition.  But  it should be  checked,  by  examining 
annually public  contracts  exceeding  a  certain value, 
that  the  proceedings  conform with  the  law  in that bids 
from  foreign enterprises  have  been  considered  under 
the  same  rules  as  those  from  national  firms. -18-
In  the  second place,  the  public  supply  contracts 
show  the  characteristic of being  coupled  directly with 
industry  and  of short-circuiting the  controlling 
mechanisms  of commerce.  These  contracts  in consequence 
represent  a  body  of strategy currently utilized towards 
ends  of general  interest, where  figure  pre-eminently the 
ad)ustment  of market  conditions  and  industrial policy 
in  the  broadest  sense.  Under  these  conditions it is 
neither likely nor  desirable  the  governments  let  go 
of this  instrument  as  long  as  the  Community  is  not 
politically constituted  and  is  not  therefore  able  to 
pursue  the  tasks still presently carried  by  the  States 
themselves. 
In  certain sectors  and  for  some  supplies,  it is 
not  out  of the  question that  the  serious  objections 
raised by  the  current projected directive  on  the 
co-ordination of procedures  for  the  award  of public 
supply contracts may  be  overcome  now  or  be  within 
practical  range. 
This  is why  the  application of such  a  directive 
should  be  selective  and  the  determination of  the 
sectors  where  it would  be  feasible  seems  to  be  the 
first objective  to  propose  to  the  States.  In  an 
initial phase  its application could be  considered  as 
purely optional. 
+++++++++ -19-
!HE  NEEDS  OF  MAN  IN  THIS  FUNCTION  AS  A PRODUCER 
A second  category of collective needs tied to the 
rapid  development  of industrial society concerns man's 
needs in his function as  a  producer.  We  distinguish here 
two  areas.  One  represents  the  problems  of training and 
profess~onal mobility and  the  other represents the  problem 
of revaluation of certain working conditions in industry 
and  in the  large  enterprise. 
On  the first point  the  tripartite Luxembourg 
conference highlighted the  need  for a  Community  policy 
on  employment  because  of rapid structural changes tied  · 
to industrial development.  We  do  not  possess  the 
instruments to enable  us  to make  detailed provisions 
for employment  in the  medium  term,  and  progress in this 
field is limited  by  the  rapidity and  nature,  hard 
to foresee,  of the  changes  occurring in a  relatively 
fast  growing economy.  However  we  can  and  must 
overcome  some  of the deficiencies in our knowledge 
of the  wvolution of employment,  by  trying to fill 
the  gaps  in statistics and  by  comparing  the  studies 
being made  in each country,  which  assumes  an effort 
towards  co-ordination of concepts  and  definitions. 
As  an experiment,  one  could  try at Community  level to 
set up  forecasts  on  the  evolution of employment  in 
some  branches either in relative decline  or under 
strong expansion. 
The  problem of professional mobility is closely 
bound  up with the  problems  of training either for 
youngsters  of for adults.  The  important  progress made 
in this field  in a  country like Prance  has  been in the 
form  of national collective  agreements  affording to 
each worker a  genuine  right to  permanent  training. 
Moreover action is underway which may  ensure  the 
recycling of those  without  work.  This  example  among 
others leads us  to stress that measures  taken  on  a 
national scale  should  be  extended  by  a  Community  policy 
for co-ordinating national private  or public initiative  : -20-
lengthy training periods  for executives  and  young  workers 
in  one  or other of the  European  countries,  European 
institutions for  the  training of instructors or others 
sent  there. 
However  the  efficacity of policies implemented  in 
this field  overloads  the  scheduled  staff and  the 
institutions  and  largely depends  on  the  development 
of attitudes. 
There  seems  to  be  a  need  for  an  in-depth drive 
towards  sensitizing opinion to  the  necessity and 
advantages  of  permanent  training and  "motivating" 
those  who  will benefit  from it. This  action which  puts 
·on trial the  joint responsability of all the  partners 
in society should  find  support  among  the  various 
teaching bodies. 
In connection with increasingly rapid  technical 
and  technological progress,  the  need  for  a  revaluation 
of working conditions is asserting itself.  This 
development  is especially clearly seen in industrial 
production,  from  manual  trades  to executive  and 
management  jobs. 
The  need  for  a  fuller blossoming  of men's  potential 
abilities,  in their daily work,  will  tend  to become 
more  prominent  in proportion  to the  satisfaction of 
private  consumer needs  and  in relation to the  rise 
in  the  general  standard  of instruction and  quality 
of professional training.  Such  justified aims 
are  often thought  of  as  a  brake  on  growth.  We  think, 
however,  that  they represent  a  factor  of renewal, 
whose  importance will keep  on  growing  over the  next 
decade. 
The  reduction in working  hour~ and  the  adjustment 
of retiring age  mainly in relation to  the  strain of 
certain  jobs is an initial partial answer,  although they -21-
cannot  be  considered with no  regard  for  the  consequences 
at the  level of the  genral balance  of the  economy. 
Although it is possible  and  necessary to set medium  term 
Community  objectives in this field,  the  staggering in time 
for the  implementation  of these  measures  hinges  on  the 
national contezt. 
The  second  line  of research and  action lies within 
the  eomp·ass  of the  enterprise,  in terms  of a  social cell. 
Here  men  can  and  must  f-ind  the  right conditions for their 
development  and  in this respect,  it must  be  quite  clear, 
that today there  is an  enlargement  of the  responsibilities 
of the  head  of the  business.  We  shall stress here  the 
crucial importance  of a  policy for  communication  of 
information to staff to be  understood  as  a  means  of 
stimulating a  taste for and  a  sense  of responsibility on 
the  part  of everyone,  no matter what  the  level of  his 
function in the  company.  This  policy  assumes  special 
contours when  applied  to executives  and  foremen  for it 
must  prece  sharing preparation for decision making  and 
delegation of authority. 
The  revaluation of manual  labour is also registered 
among  the  growing  pre-occupations  of the  industrial 
enterprise.  The  experiments  running now  in all European 
countries  aimed  at checking the  disadvantages  of intensive 
mechanization and  enriching some  of the  manual  jobs  and 
especially conveyor-belt work,  are still only pilot 
studies which although still undecisive  signify awareness 
of the  problems.  In order to define  the  mainstreams  of 
desirable  and  feasible  progress  over the  next  six years, 
a  balance  sheet  on  efforts made  in this field  should  be 
a  subject for investigation within  the  framework  of the 
next  medium  term economic  policy  programme  of the  EEC. -22-
THE  REDUCTION  OF  INEQUALITIES 
A fourth  category of collective needs  corresponds 
with policies directed  towards  reduction  of inequalities 
of opportunity  and  positions.  In this field  developments 
reflect the  system of moral  values  of a  society,  a  system 
which is modified  in relation to  the  overall rise  in the 
standard  of living and  the  scope  offered  by  scientific and 
technical progress.  Here  we  find  on  one  side  :  training, 
health and  social security,  social housing  and  on  the 
other  :  policies to help those  categories which  remain  on 
the  fringe  of the  advantages  conferred  by  economic  growth 
namely  old  people,  handicapped  persons  or amongst  the  most 
underfavoured  the  migrant  workers  and  the  professional 
misfits. 
It seems  also,  that although the  policies  of aid  for 
developing countries  comply with very  complex  motivations, 
they are  not  divorced  from  the  rapid  rise  in the  standard 
of living of European  society,  which has facilitated a 
collective  awareness  of  the  responsibilities  placed  on 
the  most  affluent nations  by  the  relative  poverty of 
countries under development. 
This  problem of aid for the  developing countries 
is here  the  subject  of a  special report,  so  we  shall -n-
not  tackle it here.  Moreover,  the  size  of the  problems 
in question makes  an exhaustive  examination impossible 
and  we  shall limit  ourselves  to proposing  some  general 
guidance. 
The  satisfaction of collective needs  in this 
particular field  corresponds with  one  of the  most  complex 
phenomena  of economic  growth,  namely  that  of redistributing 
revenue  in terms  of a  combination  of  choices either moral, 
political or economic.  In  the  first place  the  dearth of 
knowledge  in this field must  be  recognized.  We  understand 
the  phenomenon  of redistribution of revenue  in the  form 
of financial f!ow.  We  are  familiar with ita source  namely 
direct  and  indirect taxation,  subscriptions to social 
security etc.  On  the  other hand  we  possess  only global 
information concerning the  recipients of these redistri-
buted  resources  and  the definition of objectives  to  be 
attained as  expressed  in financial  terms within the 
compass  of national  programming  or multiannual budgets 
has  only a  very confined  social significance.  This  lack 
of knowledge  will weigh more  and  more  heavily on  choices 
and  arbitrations  and  we  think,  that  a  really high priority 
should  be  given to  overcoming this problem.  Two  pivots 
for research seem  obligatory here.  It must  first be 
established firmly  and  precisely who  the  beneficiaries 
are  in the  flow  of finance  and  redistribution of  revenue; 
this initial study is indispensable  in order to find 
measuring gauges for  the efficacity of the  mechanisms  of 
redistribution.  This mass  of data must  be  the  subject 
of widespread  information and  form  the  framework,  in 
which the  normal  and  desirable  argument will develop 
between the  social partners.  This  argument  must  lead to 
the  definition of clear objectives which  commit  the 
collective responsibility of the  whole  of society and 
are  expressed at  the  level of political choices. 
We  do  not  want  to minimize  the difficulty of such -24-
an effort which is obviously considerable,  if only because 
it brings in non-measurable  values  and  implies  a  co-
ordination of research carried  on  in several disciplines, 
especially economics  and  sociology.  Nonetheless it seems 
to us  that  only  progress  in knowledge  in this field will 
enable  us  to find  the  answers  to  the  basic question of the 
end  results of growth,  which  we  recalled at  the  start of 
this report.  Let  us  stress that in  some  countries,  such as 
France  for example,  within the  framework  of planning, 
research has  already made  considerable  progress.  Close 
co-ordination of work  carried  out  in the  various countries 
would  obviously be  stimulating and  a  factor of rapid 
progress. 
From  now  on  it seems  that  the  technique  of Planning 
Programming  and  Budgeting,  initiated in France  under the 
name  of rationalization of budget  choices  could  be  more 
broadly developed.  This  metho:d  is only  of partial interest 
to the  collective needs  in question here,  since it approa-
ches  the  problem~ only  frcm  the  mathematical  and  economic 
profitability angle.  All  the  same  this aspect  of the  manage-
ment  of public  resources  cannot  be  overlooked.  Experien0e 
proves  that  progress in this area runs  up  against major 
difficulties namely  the  rigidity of administrative  structu-
res  and  the  training of men,  understood  in the  broad  sense 
of their capability and  attitudes.  These  two  difficulties 
will not  be  overcome  without a  certain political will-power 
which  could  be  stimulated at the European  level by  a  far 
more  systematic  comparison  of experience  and  by  pooling the 
means  of training men. 
Changing needs  and  options to be  taken in the national 
instruction and  education have  assumed  new  proportions -25-
in recent years.  Previous criteria of the efficacity of 
public action,  namely  the  raising of the  school leaving 
age,  the  admission  of greater numbers  into the 
universities have  waned  in importance,  and  the  education 
system as a  whole  is in a  state of chronic crisis of 
clashing ideologies. 
The  coming  of mass  education together with demographic 
developments  and  the  admission of greater numbers  to 
secondary university education has happened  at  a  time 
when  progress in knowledge  was  accelerating.  The  result 
has  been  considerable upheaval at the  level of teaching 
structures and  programmes  in contrast with earlier deve-
lopment  and  thus  representing an initial factor of 
disarray for teachers as for pupils and  students. 
Moreover although economic  growth  and  the  industrial 
society wield  a  positive  influence  on  the education system 
by  offering a  wider choice  of  jobs  and  careers and  raising 
the  level of qualifications,  this influence is questionable 
today for two  sets of reasons. 
Firstly it is no  longer possible  to extrapolate 
previous  trends which ensured for those  qualified,  careers 
in keeping with their ambitions  and  suited to the  education 
they had  received.  The  result is a  deep-seated  anxiety 
among  students  as  to their professional future. 
Secondly,  to adapt  the  education  system  simply to -26-
the  needs  of the  economy  is felt as  an  attack  on  the  deeply 
felt aspirations  of each individual  and  as  an  element  of 
political and  social conservatism. 
The  teaching crisis takes  the  form  of  a  repudiation 
by  the  younger generation of the  society offered to it, a 
repudiation all the  more  violent in that it is inspired  by 
a  sense  of distress  and  anxiety for the  future  and it is in 
these  terms  that  we  must  speak  of a  genuine  crisis. 
For European  society the  problem  of  the  young is of capital 
importance,  which it is not  our place  here  to discuss in 
depth,  but which must  be  included  in the  basic  concerns  of 
the  Community. 
We  shall confine  ourselves  to recalling some  partial 
aspects  of modernization in teaching  systems.  The  situation 
today  obviously calls for  some  obligatory arbitration 
concerning the  amount  of resources  in men  and  means  which 
must  be  devoted  to national education.  Among  the  courses 
of action possible, it seems  necessary to give  preferential 
attention to the  objective  of  improving  the  quality of 
teaching even if this means  reversing the  trend to 
prolonging the  average  length of studies.  These  guide 
lines would  follow in the  direction of the  policy for -27-
reducing inequality of opportunity and  would  facilitate  a 
better integration of students into active life.  On  the 
other hand it must  certainly not  prevent bringing foward 
the  starting age  of primary education,  which  plays  a 
crucial part for children in the  most  underfavoured 
categories. 
The  adaptation of official channels  of training in 
secondary  and  university education towards  job  and  career 
opportunities implies  collective co-ordination and  research 
to which industry must  contribute  by  developing medium  term 
surveys  on  the  provision of employment  and  by  striving to 
bring out  criteria of general training or professional 
qualification.  Obviously this contribution on  the  part of 
industry will be  effective  only if it is made  at the 
European level and  more  specifically within the  compass  of 
Community  industrial policy. 
In the  field  of Social Security understood  in its 
broad  sense,  the  development  of needs  corresponds with 
complex  reverse  mechanisms,  which  tend  to expand  ad 
infinitum the  range  of needs. 
Firstly,  economic  growth allows  an  overall increase 
in real incomes.  Thus  during the  period 1958  - 1970  the 
increase  in real incomes  from work  for the  mass  of the 
European  countries  reached  about  70  ~.  On  the  other hand 
with the  rise in the  standard  of living,  inequality of 
opportunity and  income  are  less easily born.  In certain 
areas which affect  the vital needs  of man,  such as health 
for instance,  scientific and  technical  progress will act 
naturally for the  venefit  of the  richest  and  to the 
detriment  of the  poorest.  So  we  can note  in all Europe-an 
countries,  that parallel with the  raising of the  standard 
of living,  there is a  trend  towards  extending policies 
for the  reduction of inequality,  shown  for instance  by 
the  evolution of social security expenditure  as  a 
percentage  of gross national income  or of household 
income. -28-
- Allowances  in Social Security as % of the  national  income 
Item  ~Year~Germany~France~Italy~Nether-~Belgium~tuxembourg~ 
.  •  •  •  .  •  lands  •  .  . 
I  •  •  •  •  •  •  •  • 
!-----~----:----*---~-~-:~--~--:-~---:-------:-------:----------:  .  .  •  . 
:Total of  : 1962:  17,3  16,3  14,0:  14,3  15,9  17,1  .  .  .  .  .  • 
:allowances:l965:  18,3  18,8  17,7:  18,0  17,1  19,6  .  •  .  .  •  • 
:in Social  :1967:  20,9  19,9  17,9:  19,9  18,4  22,5 
:  .  . 
:Security  :1968:  20,3  19,6  18,5:  20,8  19,8  22,1 
- Allowances  in Social Security as % of the net  available  income 
of households 
Item 
.  . 
.  .  .  .  .  • 
:~---------:----:-~-----:------:-----:-------:-------:----------:  .  :  .  .  . 
:Total of  :1962:  19,5  17,7  15,0:  17,5  16,7  19,2  •  •  .  .  .  .  .  .  •  .  •  . 
:allowances:l965:  20,2  20,6  :  18,8:  21,8  18,2  22,4 
:  •  .  .  . 
:in Social  :1967:  22,4  21,7  19,3:  24,3  19,8  •  24,2  .  .  .  •  • 
:Seourity  :1968:  22,3  21,6  20,0:  25,4  21,1  24,3 -29-
These  figures highlight  a  growth in the  transfers made 
by  the  various  systems  of social security greater than that 
of the national  income,  and  also the  importance  of the  trans~ 
fers  :  nearly one  fifth of the national  income. 
Within this overall package  the  two  most  important 
items  are  sickness,  for which in 1968  the  allowances were 
spread  according to the  country between  3.5  ~ and  5.5  ~ of 
the national income,  and  old  age  between 13.9  ~ and  10.6  ~. 
If we  look at these  two  items as examples,  then needs  can 
only grow,  since  progress in the  area  o~ health will 
contribute  to the  growth  of needs for eld age. 
In the  face  of this massive  trend  tawards  the  growth of 
needs  covered  by  social security all the European  countries 
are  confronted  by  arbitrations due  to the  impossibility of 
adjusting the financial  resources  to the  needs  without 
jeopardizing the  overall balance  of economies. 
These  choices  emerge  from  the  responsability of political 
authority.  The  reflect the  concepts  of each country in the 
realm  of fellowship,  but for us  they must  represent  one  of 
the  motive  elements  in European  society.  Without  wishing 
to  seek  a  useless harmonization of arbitrations, it appears 
that  the  basic  problems,  which in the  medium  term  can  only 
become  more  serious,  should  be  tackled within a  general 
reconciliation of the  Social Security systems. 
As  a  conclusion to this ezercise,  in order to take  an 
overall view of the  development  of collective needs,  it 
seems  to us that the  EEC  is a  notably positive  factor for -~-
a  fuller satisfaction of needs  to the  extent that it forms 
a  frame,  in which the  relative  successes  and  failures  of 
each country  can  be  compared.  But  to strengthen the 
Community  there  must  be  some  agreement  on  the  main 
objectives to  be  attained  in this field. 
Untillwe  have  strengthened  our knowledge  on  the  social 
efficiency of the  mechanisms  and  public  action underway  in 
the  various  countries to ensure  satisfaction of collective 
needs,  it is an  illusion to think  of defining precisely 
and  practically the  mass  of the  future  options  before  the 
Community,  which would  ensure  a  stable  balance  between 
private  and  collective needs.  This  leads us  to treat as 
a  priority investment  the  development  of studies  and 
research currently underway  at the national level and  which 
should  be  the  subject  of an initial combination within 
the  next  medium  term  policy  programme. 
In the  current  situation,  where  in the  face  of rising. 
collective needs,  arbitrations are  compulsory,  we  have 
first tried to broaden the  margin for manoeuver in public 
action while  respecting the  general balance  of the 
economy.  In this respect,  we  have  suggested,  that in  some 
sectors covering material collective needs  the  non-chargeable 
or low price  concept  be  given  up  and  the  activities in 
question be  submitted to the  play  of market  demand  and 
supply,  even if it means  subsidizing the  most  modest 
categories.  Transport  and  telecommunications  could  be 
selected as test cases. 
As  regards man's needs  in his function  ae  a  producer -31-
the necessary revaluation of manual  labour and  adjustments 
to improve  the  function  of the  big  companJ  relevant to 
the  potential abilities of men,  assume  a  dialogue  between 
all the  social partners and  a  sharper awareness  of 
everyone's responsibilities.  This  awareness  could  be 
stimulated by  systematic  comparisons at  Community  level 
of national experience.  But  although certain common 
guidelines  seem  useful and  desirable,  to establish a 
decision making  or negotiatory  organ at  Community  level 
would  be  an  illusory and  dangerous  step today,  due  to 
the  diversity of national traditions,  differences in 
ideology among  the  trade  union  organizations,  and  the 
different political situations in the  States themselves. 
The  policies directed at  reducing inequality of 
opportunity and  conditions call for a  new  approach to 
the  problems  centred  on  the  mechanisms  and  implemented 
measures,  and  which  could  be  made  on  a  Community  scale 
and  cover initially health,  education  and  old  age. 
It seems  scarcely possible  and  realistic to  aim 
here  for a  genuine  harmonization between  the  mechanisms 
operating in the  different European  countries.  But it 
is necessary to avoid  further distortion and  to define 
medium  term  Community  objectives. 
++++++ -32-
COLLECTIVE  NEEDS  AND  INDUSTRIAL  DEVELOPMENT 
First of all,  at  the  level of industry in general, 
we  recalled how  industrial development  is the  prime  mover 
in the  drive  for economic  and  social  progress.  The 
memorandum  of the  Commission  on  industrial policy paid 
special attention to defining guidelines,  which might 
encourage  the  strengthening of industry in the  Community 
and  we  think that in itself the  memorandum  forms  the 
initial face  of this  study  concerning the  means  of 
ensuring a  fuller satisfaction of collective needs.  It 
has  to be  completed  but  cannot  be  fundamentally  questioned. 
In this respect  we  must  stress,  that  industry in 
general at the  Community  level harbours considerable 
potential progress  in productivity,  even  though  a  fuller 
satisfaction of collective needs will lead  to an 
extension of service  activity,  where  this progress  seems 
very limited.  To  release  these  reserves  of productivity 
must  still be  a  vital objective  in the  development 
strategy of European  countries.  This  assumes  that public 
and  private efforts in research  and  development will be 
continued  and  that the  action  of competition at State, 
European  and  international level will be  improved. 
From  same  standpoints,  a  fuller satisfaction of 
collective needs  coincides with this demand  made  on 
industrial productivity,  whether it concerns  collective 
material goods  such  as  infrastructures in transport  or 
telecommunications,  or collective non-material  goods 
such as  professional training or health.  But  in other 
fields  the  satisfaction of collective needs  seems  to 
conflict with this demand  on  industrial productivity; -33-
in this respect it is certain that  the  fight  against 
industrial nuisance  and  pollution will be  a  new  burden 
for the  industrial enterprise;  even if a  sound  regional 
balance  implies setting up  industry in depressed  regions, 
the  profitability on  activity there  may  look less 
advantageous  than in already industrialized areas  :  at 
the  level of the  general balancing of the  econmmy,  the 
financial needs  of public investments  are  competing with 
the  financial needs  of productive  inve·stments. 
The  burdens  and  pressures  imposed  on  industrial 
enterprises by  a  fuller satisfaction of certain collective 
needs  cannot  be  considered without  regard  to their negative 
effects  on  the  plane  of industrial development;  these 
items must  be  the  subject  of harmonization at Community 
level as is the  case  for instance  in regional policy or 
by  specific directives covering certain manufactures.  This 
is a  pre-requisite  indispensible to avoid  distortion of 
competition,  which  provokes  sooner  or later more  or less 
veiled protectionist  reactions. 
Although we  have  repeatedly underlined  the  political 
nature  of the  choices  and  arbitrations called for by fuller 
satisfaction of collective needs,  we  should highlight here 
the  special responsibilities of industry as  a  whole. 
First of all it is quite  clear that in the field  of 
preservation of the  environment  and  natural resources, 
industry must  collaborate  closely in future  studies, 
which  are  absolutely vital for clarifying the  medium 
and  long term  choices.  These  studies could  be  put  in -34-
hand  very  rapidly  on  the  scale  of  some  particular 
problems,  such  as  energy  or water resources,  and  they 
could  very shortly lead  to  an  awareness  of how  much  is 
at  stake  and  the  policies to  be  implemented. 
As  we  have  indicated earlier industry also has  a 
direct  responsibility in the  field  of professional  trainin~ 
Considerable  progress  can  result  from  a  closer liaison 
between education  and  the  heads  of enterprises.  But  action 
here  must  be  an  integral part  of the  medium  term 
development  strategy of the  industrial sector and  any 
medium  term sectorial provisions must  be  accompanied  by 
a  genuine  policy  on  professional training,  installed at 
the  level of the  enterprise  and  the  professional 
organization. 
The  increase  in collective needs  opens  prospects 
of new  markets  for industry.  Medium  term provisional 
surveys  and  research for the  future  could  be  made  much 
more  thoroughly in  some  areas  such  as  city or inter-city 
transport,  the  control  system for  road  and  air traffic, 
industrialization of building and  public works  and 
development  of audio-visual  techniques  in teaching. 
But  at  the  same  time  in all areas,  where  the  potential 
development  of collective  demand  seems  considerable,  we 
must  seek  out  the  means  of  stimulating the  spirit of 
enterprise.  In this respect it certainly looks  as 
though means  can  be  implemented  on  the  plane  of technical 
research and  ~evelopment. This means  uncovering 
innovation much  more  systematically going  back if -35-
possible  as far as  the  plane  of basic  research in the  sectors 
of collective  demand  regarded  a  medium  or long term 
priorities. 
It is at the  level of the  industrial enterprise,  where 
the  different  problems  must  be  set  and  solved,  which  are 
raised  oy  a  fuller development  of man  in his function  as 
a  producer at whatever level it may  be.  The  problems  cover 
the  revaluation of manual  labour as well  as  delegation  of 
responsibility and  participation in the  life of the 
enterprise.  They  can  only be  solved  by  communication  and 
awareness  of everyone's  responsibilities. 
Although  on  some  matters  a  systematic  framework  seems 
needed  and  desirable,  it looks  as  though  the  problem  of the 
quality of life within the  enterprise  calls for specific 
solutions within each  one  in proportion to its size,  the 
nature  of its activity and  the  temperament  of the  people 
working there.  The  construction of Europe,  as  we  stressed 
at  the  start of this report,  implies  an  extended  exchange 
in the  sphere  of kn·owledge  and  people.  Thus  broader and 
permanent  comparisons  between  the  particular experience 
of every enterprise will progressively release  at  the 
European level the  answers  to the  problems  involving 
the  quality of life within the  enterprise. 
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for  four  hundred  years  the  economic  life of Western  Europe 
has  been  dominated  by  the  concept of  the  market.  The  dynamic 
of  economic  life has  been  the  production  of  goods  and  services 
for  those  who  had  the  means  and  will  to  pay  for  them.  This 
basic idea has  been  applied in successive stages of  technological 
development;  it has  itself been  a  powerful  influence in 
stimulating technological  development.  It has  changed  the 
relationships  betwe~n classes;  indeed it has  developed 
successive new  systems  of class relationships.  It has  profoundly 
influenced political development;  in  the nineteenth  cen~o~Y it 
contributed  to  the rise of  the nation state which  provided a 
unified area in which  a·  market  could be  created of  ~ size more 
appropriate  to  the scale of  mechanised  industrial  development 
than  the smaller political units of the eighteenth century  had 
been~ 
Over  the last hundred  years  howeve~ with  the very  rapid 
growth  of  productive  powe~ it  became  increasingly recognised 
that complete  dependence  of economic  activity on  producing  for 
profit by  individuals or  firms  was  not sufficient.  Production 
for profit could not for  example  be  relied on  to provide education, 
housing or purative health services in the  quen~y or  to  the 
standards  required;  nor  to ensure  an  healthy environment;  nor 
to guarantee  employment  for all those  who  wanted  to  work.  In  a 
variety  of  ways  the collective regulation of  economic  activity 
and  the  development  of  public effort have  grown.  Public 
authorities have  in  many~heres had  to  supplement or supplant 
religious or similar voluntary efforts to meet  education,  health 
and  other social needs  which  the  market  economy  could not fulfil. 
In  many  countries  too  the state has  been  obliged  to  undertake  the 
task of controlling and  sustaining parts of  the industrual structure. -2-
Thus  when  the  EEC  came  into being  there  already existed in the 
countries  which  constituted it a  varied pattern of public enterprise -
mainly  designed  to strengthen  the  economic  infrastructure - and  of 
public provision  for  a  range  of social and  human  needs. 
The  amphasis  of  the  Treaty  of  Rome  was  on  the  reduction of 
barriers  to  the operation of  competitive  free  enterprise throughout 
the  Community  and  the facilitation of  the free  movement  of  capital 
and  labour.  Such  a  wider  extension of  free  enterprise  was  expected  to 
contribute  to  economic  growth  and  stability and  so  enable  living 
standards  to  rise.  The  social  provisions  of  the  Treaty  were  expressed 
in general  terms;  harmonisation of social standards  through  the 
Community  was  seen  mainly  as  a  contribution to  free  movement  of  labour 
and  hence  more  as  a  facilitation of  economic  growth  than as  a  deliberate 
end  in itself. 
Economic  growth  and  a  rise in living standards  have  certainly 
taken place since 1958.  The  rise in private  consumption in  the 
countries of  the  EEC  during  the  period since 1955  outstripped  that of 
the  United  Kingdom  or  of  the  United States.  It also  generally  out-
stripped  the  rise in public  consumption.  Indices  of  changes  in  the 
volume  of  private and  public  consumption  are  shown  in  the  following 
table1• 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
EEC 
UK 
USA 
Japan 
Private  Consumption 
.!.222. 
79.4 
66.5 
62,0 
63.8 
69.7 
65.7 
80.1 
77.4 
52.4 
.!2§2.  l21Q 
127.2  133.2 
137.3  143.1 
131.6  140.6 
133.9  145.6 
122.4  132.0 
136.2  148.2 
133.9  1~2.4 
112.7  116.3 
132.3  134.7 
165.5 
Public  Consumption 
.!.222. 
66.0 
77.6 
60.0 
71.9 
83.0 
69.1 
92.1 
78,7 
.!2§2. 
135.4 
123.7 
113.9 
124.4 
117.3 
111.1 
119.6 
111.7 
137.7 
70.2  140.3 
!_97Q 
140.7 
129.2 
121.0 
128.7 
120.5 
119.1 
125.7 
113.2 
130.9 
1Figures  for  1955  and  1969  from  EEC  Statistical Bulletin - National 
Accounts  (1970  Year  Book).  Figures  for 1970  supplied by  the  Commission. -3-
A clear change  in emphasis  is however  now  coming  to  be  widely 
accepted as  a  result partly of  the experience  of  the  EEC 
countries,  partly of  that of  other  countries.1  Economic  growth 
is no  longer seen  as  automatically oolving social problems. 
Indeed it is clear that economic  growth  may  be  accompanied  by 
increasing ineque!ity,  environmental  pollution and  social tensions. 
The  Preliminary  Guidelines  for  a  Community  Social  Policy 
Programme  quote  the  Third  Medium  Term  Economic  Programme 
(announced  in March  1971)  as  declaring that economic  policy 
"must  serve  the  aims  of society". 
"The  Community's  economic  policy  cannot be  limited 
to· the  joint targets of  growth  and  stability.  It 
takes  on  its proper significance by  its con-
tribution  to  improving  the  conditions of existence; 
it must  aim  both at raising the  standard of living 
and  improving  the quality of life;  it must  also 
help  in achieving  great~~ solidarity for  the benefit 
of  the least-favoured groups  of  the  population." 
It goes  on  later to  quote  the  "general  objectives which  all 
member  countries regard  as  priorities" and  includes in these -
greater satisfaction of  requirements  in education, 
health and  housing; 
increased efforts to  combat  the  harmful  effects 
which  economic  growth  has  had  on  the environment; 
greater quality  of initial opportunity; 
greater justice in the distribution of  lncomes;  and 
adaptation of social welfare  schemes  to modern  needs. 
1Generally  speaking  unless  the  context  indic.ates  otherwise  the 
term ~EC' is used  in this  paper  tor  the  'Six•;  and  the 
'Community•  for  the  wider  area which  includes  those  other countries 
who  signed  the  Treaty  of  Accession  in January,  1972. -4-
The  Social  Influence of  Indu~~~ial Employment 
Industry  (which  may  here  be  taken  to stand for all gainful 
employment  whether strictly industrial in its character or  not) 
affects social life not merely  by  its products  but alsQ  by  its 
profound  influence on  the life style•of  those  engaged  in it and 
of  their families.  The  arrangement  of  the  working  week  determines 
the social life of  the  family;  the availabality of employment 
influences  the location of  the  family  home;  the security er 
insecurity of  the  employment  determine  the stability of  the 
family  living standard;  and  indeed  the  character of  the  work 
process  which  the  individual is required  to  undertake will  over 
e  period influence  him  mentally  and  temperamentally  and  may  extend 
its influence even  to  the  ways  in which  he  will be  disposed  to 
spend his ·leisure. 
Industry must  therefore  take its responsibility  to its 
workers  as  one  of  the  most  impnrtant of its social responsibilities; 
but like others it requires  for its full  discharge  a  background 
of appropriate policies  by  public authorities. 
The  greatest single contribution which  can  be  made  to  the 
well  being  of  the  worker  is  the  maintenance  of full  employment; 
which  in its turn  involve~ governments  in maintaining  a  high  and 
stable level of demand. 
Unempl~yment showed  a  considerable  decline  in  the  period 
1958-1970 in the  EEC  countries  but since  then  has  tended  generally 
to rise.  In  the  U.K.  there  was  a  steady  rise  during 1970-1971 
which  brought  the  figure  of  unemploye~ virtually to  a  million. 
Full employment  however  is not a  question merely  of  the 
total  number  of  jobs set against  the  total  numbGI  of  workers 
available;  the suitability of  the  jobs  and  their location is as 
important as  their existence.  So  beside  the figures  uf 
/unemploymePt -5-
unemployment  must  be  set the increasing migration within  the  EEC 
(which  now  involves  nearly  a  million workers),  the attraction of 
nearly  2.5 million  workers  from  outside  the  EEC  (mostly  unskilled 
workers  from  the  Mediterranean area)  and  the  migration  to find 
work  outside  the  EEC  (probably  now  involving  some  700,000  workers). 
frequently migrant  workers  are  employed  in  the least satis-
fling  and  worst paid  jobs,  with  the  worst  prospects  ~nd-outside 
their working  lives  - the least satisfactory  social cor.ditions. 
Their  position is already  being  recognised as  a  major  element 
in any  programme  to  improve  the quality  of life in Europe.  To 
quote  Guidelines  for  a  Community  Social  Policy  Programme  -
"The  cultural  gap  between  migrant  workers  and  the 
population of  the  host countries has  widened. 
In some  circles there is resistance  to,  or  dis~ 
trust of,  a  foreign  'presence'  which  is some-
times  regarded  as  excessive." 
Migrant  workers  are less and  less becoming  adapted  to  the life 
of  the  host country  and  often find  themselves  alienated from  theit 
home  country  as  well.  The  effects can  be  particularly serious 
when  the  migration of a  worker  without his  family  leads  to 
family  breakdown  and  to  harmful  effects on  the  children. 
Attention is needed  as  well  to  the social  problems  which 
arise in  the  course of  the  work  process itself.  Industries 
rise and  decline,  new  centres of employment  grow  and  old  ones 
decay,  demand  for  types  of skill and  experience  fluctuate  and 
change.  New  processes  of  work  make  more  intense demands, 
particularly on  the  nervous  resources  of  workers;  many  proces~es, 
new  and  old,  give rise to  health and  safety hazards. 
Consideration of  the social effects of  inQustrial employ-
ment  suggest the  need  for  -
continuous  action by  governments  to  ensure a  high 
and  stable level  of employment; -6-
recognition  by  employers  of  the  scale of social 
responsibility  which  attach  to  the management 
of  productive  employmenq and  the  universal  develop-
ment  of  personnel staff and  services  to  ensure  that 
that responsibility is constructively accepted; 
effective  trade  union  organisations,  recognised 
by  employers  and  governments  as  the  spokesmen  of 
workers  and  entitled to  negotiate  on  the  whole 
range  of matters  affecting  worker~ interests; 
more  rapid progress  towards  equality of  conditions 
and  opportunity  for  women; 
forecasting  of  future  manpower  requirements  of 
industry  so  thnt  training  and  retraining of  workers 
may  be  undertaken  in  a~cordance with  the  changing 
~eeds for skills and  types  of  workers; 
regional  planning  which  among  its objectives shall 
seek  to  harmonise  changes  in  the  scale and  location 
of industry  with social consideratione. -7-
Health Service 
Industrialised countries with  con=entrated populations  must 
- even if only  for  economic  reasons  - perforce  undertake  measures 
of public health which  ensure  adequate  sanitation,  a  pure  water 
supply,  control of epidemi=s,  inspecti~n of  food  supplies  and 
similar standards of  public  hygiene.  All  the  oountries  of  the 
Community  have  in fact accepted public responsibilities going 
beyond  this and  extending in one  way  or  another  to  the provision 
of  personal  medical  care. 
The  scale and  variations in expenses  incurred in this  way 
1  can  be  seen  from  the  following  table.  (These  figures  should  be 
read in the light  ~f the  fact that some  pu~lic expenditure in this 
field may  appear  under  other expenditure  headings  - under  social 
services  for  example,  or,  in the  case  of health services  for  the 
armed  forces,  under  defence.) 
Belgium 
france 
Germany 
Italy 
Luxembourg 
Netherlands 
Percentage  of  GNP  dsvoted 
to public expenditure  2n 
health 
1957  .!2§.§. 
0.5  0.7 
0.3  0.7 
1.5  2.2 
1.4  1.1 
1.2  1.6 
1.0  1.5 
Percentage of public 
expenditure  devoted 
to  health 
,!.957  1966 
1.7  1.7 
0.8  1.8 
4.0  5.6 
4.5  3.1 
3.8  4.1 
2.6  3.3 
l from  L1Evolution des  finances  publiques  dans  les etats-membrea  des 
Communautes  Europeennes  1957-1966  (published by  the  Commission  1970). -8-
Generally  speaking  the  expenditure  by  public authorities  covers 
public  healt~ and  s~nitary organisation;  payments  to  institutions for 
social  and  preventive  medicine;  and  the  expenses  connected  with 
clinics,  hospitals  and  sa~atoria.  Differences  between  countries  in 
the  method  of  financing  hospitals  and  ths  large part played  by  local 
authorities  make  comparisons  between  countries  and  analysis  of  totals 
partlcula~ly difficult to  m&ke. 
During  the  post  war  period  the  organisation of  personal  medical 
cars has  attracted increasing public attention in all developed 
countries;  and  has  indaed,  particularly in  the  United  States of 
• 
America,  been  the  subject of  a  good  dBal  of  controversy. 
Collective provision  for  such  care  exists  throughout  Western 
Europe;  but  t~e forms  of  o~ganisation &nd  the  fi~ancial errangements 
vary  grgatly  from  country  to  country.  At  one  extreme  there  are  the 
comprehensive  schemes  financed  predominantly  out of  general  taxation -
of which  the  National  Health  Service in the  UK  is the  longest established 
example,  Generally~eaking in the  EEC  countries  the participation of 
the  government is less direct and  great reliance is placed  upon  state-
supervised  insurance schemes  - generally financed  by  regular  contributrions 
from  employers  and  employees  - and  sometimes  supplemented  by  private 
insurance.  The  methods  of  organisation  vary  considerably;  and  there 
may  be  variations within a  country in  the  cover  efforded  to  groups  or 
individuals  according  to  the  provisions of  the  scheme  by  which  they  are 
covered. 
According  to  estimates  made  by  the  Office  of  Health  Ecohomics  the 
proportion of  the population  covered  by  such  health schemes  is 
1  approximately  as  follows  -
Belgium  95 
France  98 
Germany  98 
Italy  83 
Netherlands  85 
United  Kingdom  100 
1Published in  journal  "New  Society"  (London}  18.2.71. -9-
While  it is not difficult to set out the  organisational 
arrangements  which  cover  the populations of  the  countries  of  the 
Community~ it is more  difficult to  co~ment upon  the standards  of 
care  made  available.  Traditions in Medicine  vary  greatly;  even 
the  harmonisation  of qualifications - so  that qualified doctors 
may  practice  whe~e they  wish  within  the  Community  - is not yet 
achieved.  It is probable,  however,  that generally speaking 
standards  of  care  do  not  vary  greatly batween  the  countries of 
the  Community.  Anythi~g which  needs  to be  done  in direction of 
diminishing inequality is likely to relate to  the  improvement  of 
standards  and  facilitie~ in particular areas,  which  because of 
poverty or inacessibility lag behind  the standards applied generally. 
The  questiono  which  erise for  the  ruture are rather  those of 
determining priorities which  should  be  observed in future  expans-
ion.  They  must  be  considered against  the  enormous  increases in 
medical  knowledge  and  its application which  have  already occurred 
in the last quarter of a  c~ntury and  against the  further  enormous 
i~creases which  are expected. 
Already  there is a  very  large gap  between  what  is practic-
able end  what  is economically  possible;  end  the likelihood is 
that this will grow  greater.  Hence  the emphasis  which  must  be 
put on  determining  the priorities and  on  evaluating results ac 
that knowledge,  effort and skill are put to the greatest use. 
One  clear feature of the  future is that the proportion ot 
the population over  the age  of seventy ·will increase;  indeed the 
greeter the attention given  to the reduction and  treatment or 
diseases  and  injury  the  more  will this be  true.  This  may  lead to a 
shift in emphasis  from  the  tre$tmdnt of acute illness to the 
treatment of chronic illness;  and  - as is already happening  -
by  concern  for prolonging not merely  life but activity and 
enjoyment. -10-
ln some  respects allied to  this is the  requirement  for 
greater  etttention to  tha  needs  of  thg  handicappgd,  tt"1e  disa.bJ.ed 
and  ths mentelly  disturbed.  It iS  estimated that in Britein 
alone::1  there are  over  3  milll.on people  living in private  households 
who  h&va  some  physical  mentel  or 5ensory  irnpaircnent.  Of  these 
over  e.  million  can  be classified ~s handic21pped~  If  these 
figures are  representatbJQ  artd  thel'G  is  no  reason  llfhy  they 
should not  bQ  •  they  suggest  that  in  the  Community  there  may  well 
be  some  four  million  handicapped  persons  and some  eight million 
more  suffering from  impeirment.  This  is apart  from  those  in 
these  groups  who  are  in  institutional care.  There is already 
within  the  EEC  a  progrcmme  f::.•r  the  disabled u•hich  constitutes a 
valuable  beginning in this field. 
In  all  thesg  cases  - of  the  elderly,  the  disabled,  the 
handicapped,  the  mentally  disturbed  and  the  voung  chronic  sick  -
the  problems  are l'lot  purely mG!dical.  Social  arr&ngement.s  as 
well  as  medical  care  are  essential,  particularly  to  ensure  that 
members  of  these  groups  have  opportunities  of  happiness  and 
usefulness  in  company  with  their fellow  men  rather  than  becoming 
isolated  and  institutionalised. 
There  are  other projects  on  which it is  cle~r tnat 
additional  expenditure  would  result directly in  the alleviation 
of suffering or  the  saving  of life.  To  take  two  examples  -
there is now  available  a  range  of specialised medical 
equipment  which if suitable staff can  also  be  provided 
will alleviate suffering or save life; 
better emergency  arrangements  for  dealing with  road 
accidents  could  also ascure  such  a  result.  The  road 
accident is now  responsible  for  between  a  third and  e 
half of  the  deaths  of  Europeans  in  the  15  - 25  age  group 
and so constitutm the largest single cause of loss of 
life in this age  group. -11-
The  scope  for  preserving life and  enhancing activity is so 
great that it is particularly essential  to evaluate  the effects of 
treatment  and  ensure  the  most  effective use  of  resources.  This is 
also  a  field in which  there  has  been  great advance  which  permits 
the  more  effective discussion of many  questions of  technique  and 
institutional arrangements. 
what  type  of hospitals should  be  built 
what  are  the relative  advantages  of keeping  a  patient in 
hospital or returning  him  as speedily as possible  to  his 
own  home 
what  advantages  would  be  gained from  a  more  rapid 
development  of health centres 
what  scope is there for  the  use  of volunteers in 
assisting to expand  medical  and  social care? 
There  appears  to be  two  fields in which  deployment  of 
resources  would  yield benefits above  the  average 
industrial health  (embracing  occupational medicine  and 
work  environment service);  since effort here  conduces 
to industrial growth  and  to  the  exploration of  those 
aspects  of health influenced  by  the physical,  mental  and 
emotional  effects of  working  life; 
health education;  since in such  fields  as  alcoholism, 
drug  addiction,  lung cancer,  venereal disease,  home 
accidents,  child care and  occupational safety and  disease 
a  greater public understanding  can  contribute to  the 
improvement  of health standards. 
In  the field of health a  stage  can  be  foreseen  when 
political options about priorities and  about  the organisation 
of services will have  to  be  exercised. -12-
Social Security 
Since 1958  the expenditure  on  social security in EEC  countries has 
tended  to rise, both as  a  proportion of public expenditure and  as  a 
1  proportion of  t~e gross  natianol  product  •  Although,  owinq  tQ 
differences in the methode  of organisation and  finance  of social security 
arrangements  in various countries,  comparisons  cannot always  easily be 
made,  the  tendency  appears  to  have  been  for  a  levelling up  and  for  those 
countries where  in 1958  social security was  relatively less developed 
to  increase  their spending  more  rapidly  than others. 
The  trend of social security expenditure  and  the share of G.N.P. 
2  it absorbs  ere shown  in the following  table  • 
!2§!  1966  !2§.1 
Belgium  13.5  15.1  15.4 
rrance  13.1  15.5  16.1 
Germany  14.1  15.5  16.7 
Italy  11.9  15.9  15.8 
Luxembourg  13.9  16.1  17.7 
Netherlands  12.2  16.5  16.9 
Precisely  comparable  figures  are not available for  countries outside 
the  EEC;  but such  as  are available suggest  that these  percentages  are 
about  the same  as  those  in Sweden,  significantly higher  than  those  in the 
USA  or  Japan;  and  somewhat  highet  than  those in Norway,  Denmark  or  the 
United Kingdom, 
Arrangements  vary  widely  and it is hard  to generalise;  but generally 
speaking,  compared  at any  rate with  the  UK,  the  tendency  is to rely  o·n 
occupational schemes  particularly for  benefits other than old age  and 
retirement pensions;  although in all fields of social security government· 
intervention and  control of social  securi~y has  been  increasing as  a  result 
of  the  reciprocal arrangements  between  countries necessary  for  the 
effective cover  of migrant workers.  Occupational schemes  which 
/generally 
1see L'evolution des  finances  publiques 1957-1966. 
2rigures  taken  from  Basic Statistics of  the  Community  1970. -13-
generally  cover  family  allgwances  as  well  as  sickness,  maternity 
and  old  age  or  retirement provision have  come  into being as  a 
result of pressure or  the  circumstances  of particular industries. 
They  tend  to  be  earnings  related and  to  be  financed  by  substantial 
contributions  paid  by  employers  and  to  a  lesser extent by 
employees.  Despite state supervision  the  financial  contribution 
made  to social security schemes  by  general  taxation  tends  to  be 
small. 
Thus  the 1966  figures  for  the net financial  contribution of 
the state and  local authorities as  a  proportion of  the  total 
1  receipts of social security schemes  are as  follows  -
Belgium  20.2 
france  9.2 
Germany  lb.6 
Italy  17.4 
Luxembourg  26,3 
Netherlands  s.o 
A calculation for  the  United  i(ingdom  would  suggest that a  comparable 
figure  for  1966  would  be  34  and  for  1970 would  be  30.  (This  covers 
Exchequer  contribution  to  the  National  Insurance Fund,  war 
pensions,  family  allowances  and  supplementary benefits.) 
It is probably in  the  field of social security that pressure 
for  a  harmonisation of  arrangements  will  be  first and  most  strongly 
felt in  the  Community. 
1see L'evolution des  finances  publiques  1957-1966,  pp  155-6. -14-
Education 
In  the  period 1950-65  educational endeavour,  as  measured  by  school 
and  university  enrolments,  rose substantially in the countries  covered 
by  the  EEC,  as  indeed it did  in other European  countries.  It is 
significant  though  that in the  case  of  primary  and  pre-primary enrol-
menta  (which  are  of  course  closely affected  by  changes  in the birth 
rate)  the  increase  was  13%  ~ while at the secondary  and  higher levels 
the  figures  were  101%  and  134%  respectively1• 
Throughout  the  EEC  elementary  education is compulsory  from  at 
latest 6  to at least 14.  In  many  areas  the  legal age  for school 
leaving is already  higher  - but in others  the  legal  requirement of 
education  to 14  is not fully effective.  There  is in fact  a  marked 
tendency  for  schooling  to  be  prolonged;  the  number  of  children who 
2  actually leave  school at 14  is falling year  by  year  and  the  age  of 
leaving is generally nearer 16.  Despite  a  growth  in educational  planning 
in  the last decade  the  statistical material  leaves  a  good  deal  to  be 
d  .  3 
es~rec  • 
Major  considerations  which  may  play  their part in  influencing 
educational  growth  include  -
the  strong and  increasing  demand  for  education expressed 
by  pupils  and  their parents.  The  growth  in demand  has 
accompanied  changes  in the social structure and  the  rise 
in G.N.P.  per capita.  It coincides  with  the  need  for  a 
more  highly  educated  body  of citizens in a  society  which 
is growing  increasingly  complex.  Those  leaving school 
at the  moment  will  be  active  participants  in industry,  the 
professions,  and  the  life of  society until  perhaps  the  year 
2015,  2020  - or  beyond.  It is manifest  that the education 
/w~ich 
1 
2see  DECO  Conference  on  Policies for  Education  Growth,  Vol.II, p.ll. 
3see  L'evolution des  finances  publiques  1957-1966,  p.  57. 
See  DECO  Conference  on  Policies for  I=" rlr """3tion  Growth  Vol.  I I,  p.  77. -15-
which  they  now  receive  must  fit them  to deal with 
the  many  changes  in industry and  society which  they 
will see. 
Recognition  that education is an  investment by 
society  and  that society is entitled to expect 
maximum  benefits  - compared  with  those  which  an 
alternative use  of  the resources  devoted  to education 
might  produce. 
The  degree  to which  the  educational  system  can  provide 
in broadly  the  right numbers  the individuals with 
the skill,  and  training which  industry  and  society 
require  in ths future  for  the  wide  range  of 
vocations  open. 
The  contribution which  the educational system  can 
make  to  a  greater increase of social equality and 
equality of opportunity. 
~ithin the  education system individuals exercise choice 
subject to  the legislation of  the  country  in which  they  live, 
and  the  wide  variety  of options which  the educational  system 
offers,  so  t~at a  good  deal  of what  is described as  educational 
planning is necessarily  concerned with  forecasting  educational 
expansion  rather  than  influencing it.  So  far  the strong  demand 
for  improvement  in educational opportunities at all levels  has 
coincided with  the  need  of  the  nations  of  the  Community  for  greater 
numbers  of skilled and  qualified individuals.  It may  be  that 
in the  future  the  relationship between  economic,  social and 
educational  needs  will  become  more  complex.  The  pans  of  the 
countries of  the  Community  appear  to  envisage  an  expansion  rather 
than  a  diminution  of  higher  education and  this could lead  to  more 
graduates  being  available  than  there  are posts  which  have 
traditionally been  regarded  as  appropriate  to  such  a  standard 
of educational  quelificati~n. -16-
Such  a  situation may  appropriately be  regarded  along  the 
lines of  (1)  the  social  advantage  to  the  individual  and  to  the 
Community  of generally  higher  educational  standards. 
growth  of occupations,  e.g.  in  the  fields  of  administration, 
social  welfare  and  parts of industry in  which  the quality of 
performance  will  be  raised  by  the  employment  of  individuals of 
higher  educational standards.  (3)  The  reorganisation of 
parts of industry  and  administration so  that work  hitherto 
performed  in a  routine manner  under  supervision may  permit  more 
flexibility  and  more  initiative by  the  individual. 
The  interaction of social,  economic  and  educational  neeys 
can  be  reconc~led along lines which  not  only  permit  to  the 
individual  the satisfaction of a  higher  educational standard but 
lead to social  and  economic  advantage. 
Educational  growth is likely to  eontinue in  the seventies. 
The  traditional system of education with its elitest character 
is being  transformed into a  system  of  mass  education  •  not  without 
controversy.  The  following  may  be  seen  as  lik~\y fields 
requiripg particular priority. 
Pre-primary education.  The  widespread  changes  in  the 
character of  primary  education since  the  end  of  the 
Second  World  War  have  been  perhaps  the  most  dramatic 
of  the moves  away  from  an  academic  orientation and 
tow~rds an  educatioGal  system  based  upon  developing 
the  full  range  of  the  individual's abilities and 
talents.  Pre-school  education  also  has  great 
significance in meeting  the  needs  of  children 
belonging  to socially 9isadvantaged  groups  for  whom 
much  subsequent educational effort is likely to  remain 
ineffective unless  they  are  helped  to  overcome  the 
initial obstacles  to  achievement. -17-
Upper-Secondary  Education.  Taking  the Community  (and indeed 
the  OECO  countries as  a  whole)  there has  been  a  doubling of 
enrolment in upper  secondary education between  1955  and  1965. 
for most  European  countries  the continuation of this trend 
towards  the full  enrolment up  to the 17-18  years  age  group 
would  imply  great expansion in total  numbers.  At  their sixth 
Conference in May  1965  the European  Ministers of  Education 
formally  stated their view  -
"that the period of education should be  extended to eleven  ~r 
twelve  years  for all and  that education be  based  on  a  broad 
common  curriculum~ 
The  tendency  of lower  secondary education  to  become  less 
selective, comb!ned  with  the past and  prdspective growth  af 
upper  secondary education,  will mean  that the period of 
common  educational  experience for  the whole  population will 
gradually lengthen.  This is socially desirable - in producing 
a  more  highly  educated population end  reducing  those divisions 
which  had  their origins in varying educational arrBngements 
for different classee - and  is also valuable  as  a  foundation 
for  academic,  occupational  and  professional  training. 
Higher  education  including recurrent nr  'permanent'  education. 
The  number.  of students is likely to increase but the choices 
made  by  students for specialised fields  of study have  tended 
to diverg&  from  those which  would  match  the  forecasts of demand 
for  the  various  types  of specialist.  At  the same  time  forms 
of higher education may  change;  already  the old dioisions 
are breaking  down  between  academically oriented higher education 
in Universities and  the more  vocationally oriented  ed~cation 
in other institutions.  Indeed  there is need  to examine  how 
the  relationship of higher educational institutions to 
social requirements  may  be  improved  without prejudice to 
their independence.  As  the rapidity of social and  technical 
change  is recognised  however  the importance of permanent -18-
education will  be  incrEasingly  emphasised,  This  form  of 
higher  education  may  prove  to  be  one  of  the  most  substan-
tial and  significant areas  of educational  growth.  Individuals 
will  be  involved in it irrespective of  their attainment in the 
formal  educational  system;  and  it will  assume  a  variety of 
forms  - among  them  spare  time  courses  perhaps  covering  a 
number  of years;  part  time  courses  covering usually shorter 
periods  and  sabbatical spells of full  time  refresher education 
at intervals in  workinq  life. 
At  the  same  time  - as  in other  developed  countries  - there 
are  claar  inequalities in  the educational  opportunity of  individuals, 
marked  both  by  regional  differences  within countries and  by  class 
differences.  This  is a  complex  subject but  the scale and  importance 
l  of it can  be  to  some  extent seen  from  the  following set of  figures  • 
1 
Relative  chances  of  Upper  Stratum and 
Lower  Stratum Youth  Studying  in a  University 
~  U£!eer  Stratum  Lower  Stratum 
Belgium  1962  - 63  7  l 
1966  - 67  8  1 
France  1959  - 60  84  :  1 
1964  - 65  30  l 
Germany  1952  - 53  82  l 
1958  - 59  61  1 
1961  - 62  58  1 
1964  - 65  48  1 
Ireland  l961  20  1 
Italy  1953  - 54  44  1 
1960  - 61  36  :  1 
1964  - 65  34  1 
Luxembourg  1964  - 65  65  1 
Netherlands  1958  - 59  73 .  1  . 
1961  - 62  56  1 
1964  - 65  45  1 
Norway  1964  - 65  7  1 
United  Kingdom  1961  - 62  8  1 
Japan  1952  20  1 
1961  30  1 
United States  1958  5  1 
Extracted  from  Table  0  (p.BB)  in  Volume  IV  of  Background  Documents 
for  DECO  Conference. -19-
The  OECO  Conference  on  Policies  for  Educational  Growth  (held 
in Paris in 1970)  provided  the  occasion  for  a  number  of  countries 
participating to offer estimates  of future  enrolments.  These  are 
1  set out in the  table  below  together  with  estimates  made  independently -
by  the  OECD  Conference  Secretariat - on  the  assumption  that  the educatian 
system will  develop  in accordance with·certain  trends prevailing between 
1950  and  1965.  These  Secretariat calculations do  not  take  account of 
national  forecasts  or even of  the likely effect of projected  reforms  now 
known;  in each  case  they  provide a  range  of forecasts  af which  in  the 
table  the  minimum  and  maximum  are shown.  The  national forecasts  and 
the  independent calculations both relate to total enrolments  but  the 
table also  shows  in brackets for  each country  the  figure  calculated for 
higher education.  From  this table  therefore  can  be  gained  a  general 
impression of likely growth  in educatian during  the seventies. 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
Denmark 
Norway 
Ira  lAnd 
USA 
United  King,.om 
Indices  of Future  Increase  in Enrolments 
National  Fore~ 
and  period 
125  (1966  - 1980) 
129  (1967  - 1975) 
150  (1966  - 1990) 
125  (1967  - 1980) 
127  (1968  - 1979) 
127  (1969  - lY~O) 
1~5 (1968  - 1981) 
120  (1968  - 1978) 
Secretariat 
Calculationdl965"oa) 
110  - 130 
(224  - 300) 
101  - 131 
(193 -2  87) 
118  - 147 
(205  - 359) 
116  - 180 
(156  - 338) 
J.l8  - 164 
(116  - 206) 
115  - 122 
(159  - 169) 
107  - 130 
(208  - 297) 
119  - 137 
(172  - 277) 
125  - 151 
(167  - 270) 
lt19  - 179 
(139  - 24~) 
1rhe  table is compilen  by  extracting figures  from  Table  6  ofAnnox  lV  end  Ta~le I 
at'  Anne~< ll of  Vnluma  li of  tho  r.nnferenr.e  Documents. -20-
Countries  have  also  put  forward  estimates  of  the  enrolment 
rates  current and  forecast  as  percentages  of  the  l  age  groups  concerned  • 
The  table  below  indicates  the  position for  those  Community  countries 
which  provided  these  forecasts  and  for  the  USA  and  Japan. 
Enrolment  rates  around  1968  and  1980 
(as  a  percentage  of  the  age  group) 
5  :tears  14  :tears  17  :tears  21  ~ears  24  ~ears 
USA  1968  88(a)  98(b)  90(c)  31 (d)  14(e) 
Japan  1969  66(f)  lOO(g)  81(h)  24(i) 
Norway  1968  99  57  18  10 
Belgium  196ii  100  87  47  13  6 
1980  100  98  66  19  14(e) 
Denmark  1968  5  88  49  15  9 
1979  36  100  85  22  2 
1984  48  100  !0  29-34  3 
France  1967  99  85  40  10  5 
1975  100  100  54  13  7 
Italy  1966  56  27 
1980  80  43 
Netherlands 1967  94  91  35  9  5 
1980  99  100  68  20  8 
Ireland  1968  72(f)  81  31  7(j) 
1981  78(f)  98  60  12(j) 
Luxembourg  1967  90  qs  27(k)  9  5 
(a)  5  and  6  year  olds  (g)  12  to 14  yea:- olds 
(b)  14  and  15  year  olds  (h)  15  to 17  year  olds 
(c)  16  and  17  year  clds  (i)  18  to  21,  year  olds 
(d)  20  and  21  year  olds  (j)  20  to 24  year  olds 
(e)  22  to  24  year  olds  (k)  4l  with part-time students 
(f) 4  and  5  year  olds 
from  this table  emerges  a  clear indication of  the  lag  which 
on  present intentions appears  likely  to  exist in 1980  in  ~pper 
secondary  and  higher education.  Countries  in the  Community  do  n~t 
generally  appear  to expect  to  reach  in  these  fields  the ratio of 
enrolment  reached  now  in  tf~e  USA  and in the  upper  se.condary  case, 
Japan. 
1 The  table is compiled  by  extracting figures  from  Table  8  of 
Annex  IV  of  Vo,ume  II of  the  Conference  Documents. -21-
While  this analysis  has  of necessity  been  made  in  terms  of 
the position and  plans of  individual  countries  there is a  clear need 
for  discussion  on  a  Community  basis which  wlll establish reciprocal 
recognition of degrees  and  professional qualifications. 
The  achievement  of appropriate social goals in education  by 
1980  (even  on  the  basis  of  achieving  national  objectives currently 
foreshadowed)  is likely  to  require an  increase of  the order  of 
100  per cent in  the proportion of  G.N.P.  which  in the period 
1966-67  was  being devoted  to  education.  Careful  planning will 
therefore  be  needed,  linked  to evaluation designed  to ensure  that 
objectives are attained by  the  most  effective use  of  resources 
dedicated  to  the purpose.  Such  a  perspective gives rise to 
comment  on  the availability of students,  teachers  and  facilities 
(including buildings). 
The  first question  which  ·requires  comment_ia  whether society 
can  bear  the loss of productive  manpower  implied  by  a  higher 
proportion of  the members  of each of  a  number  of  age  groups  being 
retained in full-time  or part-time education.  Howev~r with  the 
accelerating rates of  change  in industry  and  in society a  constant 
rise in  the  standard of education is a  priority which  must  be 
accepted.  The  losses in direct productive power  resulting from 
longer  educational  periods  a  e  likely t"  be  more  than  made  up  by 
the  benefits - even measured  in higher industrial efficiency alone 
- which  result. 
Teachers  represent only  a  small  percentage of the labour 
force  - although  they  represent a  substantial proportion of  the 
qualified professional manpower  in a  society.  A development 
of  the  educational  system creates its own  increasgj supply  of 
teachers  - since students are potential  teachers.  While  there 
may  be  need  for  examining  specially the  position of  teachers in 
some  subjects  where  shortages arise  there  can  be  no  real anxiety 
that the  expansion of education will  founder  through  teacher 
shortage.  /So  far  as -22-
So  far  as  building  and  equipment  are  concerned,  while all 
appropriate steps  must  be  taken  to  see  both  are  used  as  inten-
sively  as  possible,  by  sharing  between  institutions and  making 
them  available for  other  public and  cultural  use  durin~ vacation 
periods  and  in  the  evenings,  there is again  no  need  to  suppose 
that  the  provision of  the  buildings  and  equipment  reyuired will 
put  an  impossible  burden  upon  the  countries  of  the  Community. -23-
Housing 
There  is no  need  to  stress  the  fun~ame"tal importance  of 
housing  for  a  happy  and  healthy  family  life.  There  is still a  chronic 
shortage of housing  and  much  available housing is of unsatisfactory 
stand~rd. 
As  with  so many  other desirable elements  in a  life of go•d 
quality  however it is not easy  to define  what  is~eal, for  standards 
of aspiration vary  from  country  to  country  and  continue  to rise.  In 
general  however  the  aim  must  be  a  supply  of  accommodatio~ sufficient 
to ensure  for each  family  a  separate dwelling of adequate size with 
full  range  of  internal facilities  and  with  privacy;  situated 
reasonably  near  the place of work;  sa located or so  served by 
transport as  to permit social contacts;  and  at a  price which  the 
houss~older can  pay.  In addition,  special  requirements  of the 
elderly,  of unmarried adults, ef handicapped  persons,  of large 
families end  of migrant  workers  must  be  recognised-
By  wcrld standards the  population of  the  countries of  the 
Community  reckon  generally speaking as  among  the best housed;  but 
nevertheless  there exist inadequacies  which  necessitate a  s~bstantial 
effort in this field before conditions  and  the  ~ate of progrees  can 
be  regarded  as  acceptable. 
The  housing stock of  individual countries is influenced by  a 
number  of~ctor~ including past history,  the  denographic  pattern and 
the  changes  which  have  taken place in it, and  the distribution of 
economic  activity.  The  war  years,  partly because of destruction 
and  partly because  of  the interruption of  new  building,  produced a 
widespread  end  acute  housing shortage.  The  effect •f this has 
been  accentuated by  a  number  of post  war  social factors,  notab!y  the 
insistent demand  for  higher standards.  All  governments  in the 
Community  countries have  been  obliged  to  take  note  of  this and  to 
ensure  that public authorities assume  a  considerable responsibility 
for assisting in a  wide  variety of  ways  to  increase and  develop  the 
housing  stock. -24-
It is not  easy  to  give  a  general  picture of  the  housing 
situation  throughout  the  Community.  For  a  comprehensive  account  on 
a  comparable  basis  the  ~'.N.  report  on  Housing  Perspectives  in Europe 
(Geneva  '968)  had  to  go  back  to last national  census  figures.  These 
related  to  the early sixties - usually  to  1960  or 1961.  They  showed 
as  between  the various  countries of  the  Community  variations  from  3.1 
to  5.2  in the  number  of  rooms  per  dwelling;  3.0 to  4.0 in  the  number 
of persons  per dwelling;  0.62  to 1.14 in  the  number  of  persons  per 
rocm  and  225  to  335  in  the  number  of  dwellings  per  thousand persons. 
There  was  similarly a  range  between  countries in  the  propartion of 
houses  with  various  indoor  amenities.  The  percentage  with  piped 
water  varied from  51.0  to  98.4 per  cenU with  indoor  toilets from  39.9 
to 91.7  per cent;  and  with fixed  baths  or  showers  from  23.6  to 77.4 
per cent.  Without  doubt  a  table  compiled  ~n a  basis  which 
isolated figures  for  particular regions  within countries  would  have 
shown  a  greater  range  of variatien. 
The  house  building effort throughout  the  Community  during  the 
post ~  years  has  been  considerable.  Its continuing scale may  be 
judged  from  the last three  years  for which  comparable  figures  ere 
availeble1• 
~from Table 1  and  Table  5  of Housing  Statistic in Expose  sur 
l'evolution de  la situation socials dans  la Communante  en 1970. N
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Despite  the efforts  of  the  post  war  years  however  it was  possible 
for  the situation in  the  European  countries  to  be  summed  up  in  1970 
as  follows  -
Even  in countries  where  the  interploy  of  the 
instruments  of  the  private capital  market  and 
government  policy,  selective credit controls  and/or 
direct  regulation  of  the  building  market  resulted in 
a  rather positive  development  as  in  the  Netherlands, 
Ncrway  and  Swaden,  the  achievements  were  not 
sufficient to  cover  the  needs,  especially if urban 
renewal  is  taken  into account.  !his was  even  less 
the  case  in most  other countries. 
It is  not  easy  to assess  the  current  need.  The  UN  EuropAan 
Housing  Report  makes  some  calculations  - which  appear  to  be  on  a 
cautious  and  conserv~tive basis.  A table in  this  report  (C.6)  -
somewhat  simplified - sets out  the  average  annual  housebuilding 
rate  that would  have  to  be  achieved  between  the  beginning  of 1966 
and  the  end  of  the  perind  of  estimete if both  the  estimated 
dwelling shortages  and  tentative future  normative  housing  require-
ments  were  fully  included in  the  house  construction  programme. 
Belgium 
Denmark 
France 
Ireland 
Germany 
Netherland 
United 
K!.;;g~rm 
(r;;,  nnly) 
s 
Period of 
estimate 
1~65-1984 
1961-1980 
1962-1980 
1962-1971 
1968-1975 
1965-1979 
1966-1970 
Estimated dwelling  Average  annual 
shortage  including  number  of 
tentative future  dwellings 
requirements,  estiml:'ted 
average  annual  1961-1965 
requirement  per 
000  inhabitants  OOOs 
6.2 - 7.9  5.3 
5.4 - 8.8  7.6 
8.7 - 10.6  7.3 
4.6  2.9 
8.0  10.2 
9.1  7.7 
17.0  6.3 
Such  a  table might  appear at first sight reassuring. 
however  be  borne  in mind  that  the  estimates  of  future  housing 
/need 
Tentatively  to 
be  constructed 
from  1966  to 
end  of  period 
1 
of  estimatee 
i  (annually) 
I  OOOs 
i 
I 
l  6.2  8.0  I  -
t 
i 
i 
4.7  - 9.2 
' 
i  9.0 - 11.3 
1 
l  5.6  I 
I 
i 
I  8.0 
i  9.1  I 
f 
I 
i  17 .o  I 
r 
i 
! 
It must 
1  From  summary  and  conclusion  of  paper  "Some  achievements  and  trends  io 
housing  in selected European  countries  and  USA  prepared  for EEC  housing, 
building and  planning  Committee  (HBP/HOU/42)  November  1971 
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need  leave out of  account  some  impcrtant factors.  They  include  the 
demand  arising  from  denographic  forecasts  and  from  the  need  to  replace 
dwellings  which  are either  no  longer fit for  human  habitation  (by  the 
standards  of  the country  in question)  or likely to be  demolished 
because  of  future  economic  or social  needs;  but  they  do  not  appear 
to  take  account  of  the  continuing  demand  for  higher  housing standards. 
A further  indication of  the  future  need  may  be  gained from  the 
following  table1• 
Stock  of 
\  %  I  bu~lt 
I 
dwellings  I  built 
000  I before  ~afore  Council 
I  1914  1945 
I  I 
I  I  ; 
Belgium  I 
I 
1400,000  dwellings 
' 
(1968)  3493  47  71  regard-
I 
1 
1 
ed  as  slums  to be  demo!-
ished.  600,000  require 
~ 
m~Ddernisaticn.  I 
! 
france  18256  47  72  7.5m  dwellings  fall  l  (1968)  below  elementary stand- i 
ards  of modern  comfort.  I 
Germany  20596  33  50  7m.  dwellings  need  tA  be  I 
I 
(1968)  replaced or modernisea. 
I 
I 
Italy  16822  - 54  Several million dwell-
House 
building 
programme 
1  r1  midrll P 
term  (OOCs 
Annually) 
60 
510 
500 
460 
(1969)  ings  need  to  be  (estimate) 
modernised. 
Luxembeurg  106  - 60  - 2 
(1968) 
Netherlands  3687  28  54  350,000  awellings  regard- 125/130 
(1969)  ed  as  sluos.  250,000 
require  improvem9nt. 
United  18488  apf.Jrox.  2m.  dwellings cate-
Kingdom  35  Eng- gorised as slums; 
355 - 380  (1969)  land  2m.  more  lack essentials 
46  Wales  such  as  bathrooms  and 
indtv•r  toilets. 
This  suggests  that of  a  tatal housing stock  of  just over  80  million 
some  25  million must  be  regarded as  in  need  of  improvement  cr replacement. 
1From  Table  of  Preliminary  Guidelines  for  a  Community  Social  Programme 
United  Kingdom  figures  addes  from  U.K.  sources. -28-
This  may  be  set beside  the  housing  target announced  for  the  United 
States in 1968  - the  construction of  26  million dwellings  over  a  10 
year period.  This  target  was  equivalent  to  a  40  per  cent  increase  in 
the housing  stcck  taking  account of demolitions  during  the  period in 
questiono  It was  recognised  too  that  to  meet  this target would  require 
a  much  more  substantial degree  of  public financial  aid  than  had 
previously  been  available. 
Perhaps  in all the best guide is to  take  account of  the 
observations  about  the  future  included in the  UN  Survey  (which  of 
course  embraced  a  wider  range  of countries  than  the  Community). 
"It has  emerged  from  the  findings  of  the  study  that 
no  country  has  yet attained a  standard of  housing 
which  it could regard  as •ufficient or satisfactory. 
Moreover  practically no  country  has  achieved  a  house 
building rate in the  rece.nt  past which  would  be  high 
enough,  or at least relatively near  to  that which 
would  be  desirable,  to meet  estimated  future  normative 
housing  requirements  and  to  eliminate dwelling 
shortages  over  the  period  of  estimate  (i.e.  normally 
by  1980)  •••••••••• 
"These  stark facts  make  it strikingly clear  that 
the existing housing  problems  cannot  be  easily solved 
during  one  or  two  decades,  and  that as  soon  as 
housing  requirements  estimated at present have  been 
met,  other  and  new  housing  needs  will emerge.  The 
main  concern in any  country  should  be,  given its 
particular circumstances,  to raise  housing  standards 
for  all groups  of  the  population as  high  and  as 
quickly  as  possible  ••••••••••••••••••  " 
In  recent years  there  has  come  to  be  increasing recognition 
of  the part which  the modernisation and  improvement  of  exieting 
dwellings  can play  in efforts  to  raise standards of  housing.  In 
the  United  Kingdom  for  example  the 1969  Housing  Act  greatly increased 
the  grants  which  may  be  paid  to enable owners  of  houses  which  are 
basically sound  but  which  lack  some  of  the essential amenities  to 
install such  amenities  and  bring  the  houses  up  to  a  good  standard. 
Similarly  the  EEC  launched in June  1970  an  experimental  two-
year project to rehabilitate old  houses  as  part of  the  programme  for 
improving  housing  of  ECSC  wcrkers.  It was  pointed out that 
/a -~-
a  ~rogramme on  these lines would  have  housing effects 
similar  to  new  building since itwculd raise  the proportion of 
the  population  who  have  satisfactory living conditions.  The  immediate 
intention was  to mount  in each  country  concerned  two  or  three  operations 
each  covering about  one  hundred  houses.  Rat1ical  improvements  would  be 
mede  inaCer to seek  new  technical methods  of  doing such  work  based on 
the application  to  house  improvoments  of  rationalised and 
industrial methods. 
If  the  experiment  proves  a  success  the methods  devised will 
obviously  be  of wide  application. 
Two  other major  considerations must  be  borne  in mind  in any 
discussion  of programmes  - particularly of  new  construction.  The 
first is that of cost to  the  house  occupier;  the  second  the relation-
ship between  housing  and  environr.tental  planning. 
It has  been  a  widespread experience,  at any  rate in developed 
countries,  that a  measure  of subsidy is necessary  to ensure  even 
moderate  housing standards.  The  forms  of subsidy  are  very  diverse; 
they include direct payments  from  national  or local tax  resources  to 
enable  houses  to be let below  the cost of  building and  maintaining 
them;  capital for  house  building made  available at artifically low 
rates of intPrest either  t~ individual  house  purchasers or  to public 
authorities which  provide  hauses  for  =ent;  disregard for ihccme  tax 
purposes  of  income  devoted  to paying interest charges  an house  purchase; 
and  so forth.  Indeed it is asserted that in a  large  number  of 
countries 80  - 90  per cent •f new  constructien attracts direct er 
1  indirect public aid  •  The  figures  given  above  of  houses  built 
during 1967  - 1969  show  that taking  the  EEC  countries as  a  whole, 
almost  50  per  cent of  the houses  built in each  year were  subsidised. 
Rising standards of  housing,  rising interest rates and  rising 
cost of land have  made  the situation more  difficult.  During  the 
sixties a  number  of countriqs  relaxed  the controls  upon  rent levels 
/which 
1IcrTU/IFBWW  study:  "The  housing situation of  low  income  groups"  1970. -30-
which  previously  existed  - although  generally  speaking  the  relaxatian 
of  rent  control  has  been  accompanied  by  new  measures  of assistance 
to poorer  tenants.  But,  even  with  the  various  measures  lndicate~ 
above,  adequate  housing  absorbs  so  high  a  proportion  of  the 
expenditure  of  many  low  income  families  as  to  constitute  a  severe 
burden.  Some  substantial  subsidisati~n of  housing  from  the  funds 
of  public authorities - whatever  form  it may  take  - is likely  to 
continue  for  as  far  ahead  as  can  be  foreseen. 
Further  a  home  provides  for  a  family  not  merely  shelter.  It 
must  be  provided  with services  and  must  form  part of  a  community  in 
which  children can  be  educated,  employment  for  the  family  wage-earners 
can  be  found  and  all the  other apparatus  of social life is available. 
Thus  housing  must  be  considered in relation  to  town  planning  and 
control  of  land use. 
the  environment. 
This  raises  wide  issues  of  improvement  of -31-
Comprehensive  Social  Provision 
The  items listed so far  do  not  exhaust  the  requirements  of social 
provision.  One  additional field for  example  is that of  the  prevention 
and  treatment of  crime.  This subject has  connections  with education, 
health and  welfare  services;  it raises issues  of  prevention, -law 
enforcement,  custody  and  rehabilitation;  and  it involves directly the 
maintenance  of  a  whole  range  of  police,  prison and  probation services, 
and  of institutions for  the  handling  of  the  inadequate,  the  delinquent 
and  the  criminal.  A society is distinguished  by  the  services  which it 
needs  and  provides for  those  who  deviate  from  its norms  of  honesty  and 
peaceful  relationships  with others;  to find  ways  to ensure that a  child, 
adrilespent  or  adultshall be  rehabilitated rather  than confirmed in a 
life of  crime  constitutes a  clear gain in human  fulfilment,  as  well 
as  a  saving  of  the cost  which  society will  otherwise inevitably  incur. 
A comprehensive  and  forward  looking  programme  is likely to  involve  the 
rebuilding  of  many  prisons  and  other custodial institutions,  the  develop-
ment  of  new  methods  and  higher  standards  of  selection and  training of staff. 
Equally  there  would  be  scope  for  examining  the  future  needs  of 
the  peoples of  the  Community  in the  fields  of  recreation  and  leisure. 
Such  an  examination  would  raise ·issues of  the~ture pattern of  work  and 
incomes,  transport developments  and  the preservation of leisure and 
recreational areas. 
However,  what  has  already  been  set out  in  respect of  health, 
social security,  housing  and  education gives  a  broad  indication of  the 
scope  for  advance  in social provision and  indeed  the  necessity  for 
such  an  advance  on  a  wide  front.  Yet  it is clearly difficult to 
assess  the  needs  or chart  the  future  with precision.  In  housing 
for  example  the  standards  sought constantly rise;  in health and 
education  there is vast scope  for  further  action - but  room  for 
genuine  differences of  judgment  about  priorities and  about  the  most 
effective methods  of achieving  commonly  accepted  aims. -32-
In  all the  major  fields  the  assessment  of future  requirements 
which  have  been  attempted  have  been  influenced to  varying extent by 
the  power  which  individuals  have.  This  is true  even  where  a  sub-
etantial assistance  - through  public expenditure  or  mutual  organisations -
is provided.  Once  a  service is available mnre  cheaply  - or  even  free  -
needs  which  have  not hitherto  been  expressed  are likely to  make  them-
selves  known. 
The  principle for  which  we  must  strive is that provision  - in 
education,  health,  social welfare,  and  housing  - must  increasingly 
be  made  on  the  basis  of  human  needs,  the  recognition of  individual 
dignity  and  the entitlement of  each  man  or  woman  to  achieve his or 
her  full  potential.  Such  principles  imply,  for  example,  a  greater 
acceptance  of  equality  of  education;  a  standard of  housing 
accommodation  required for  human  dignity  below  which  no  family  or 
individual shall fall;  and  health,  welfare  and social security systems 
which  embrace  all on  the  basis of right rather  than  of ability  to pay, 
contribution qualification,  or  eligibility for  some  particular insurance 
scheme.  The  acceptance  of  such  general  aims  will  lead over  a  period  to 
harmonisation  of social provision  throughout  the  Lommunity, 
In  effecting social progress  no  country  can  stand still until 
others  have  in a  particular respect caught  up  with it;  so  that  the 
concept  of  European standards,  bringing all up  to  the level of  that 
which  in a  particular field is reqarded  as  the best,  is not  a  useful 
guide  to  immediate  action.  There  is in many  cases at present  room  for 
debate  about  which  standard is the best. 
In  education,  housing  and  health there is therefore  need 
for  the  greatest interchange  of  experience  and  of  ideas,  and  for 
each  country,  according to its own  priorities  and  problems,  to 
increase  the propcrtion of its effort directed  to social improvement. 
/The -~-
The  promotion  of common  recognition of qualifications and  the 
organisation where  appropriate of  joint initiatives between  twa 
or more  countries can  contribute to this.  from  such exchanges 
will develop  a  tendency  to  harmonisation of practice and  standards 
upon  the basis of the best.  The  Community  institutions can  play 
a  co-ordinating role.  In  social security schemes  the progress 
towards  harmonisation may  well  have  to be  more  rapid and  the  role 
of the  Community  institutions more  positive. 
While  a  definition of precise aims  covAring  the whole 
C•mmunity  may  be  impossible at any  rate at present,  there can 
be  no  doubt of  the r.eed  for  acceleration of  the  pace  of  s~cial 
advance.  The  ~ontrast between  mankind's  achievements  in such 
fields as space travel and  the failure  to meet  human  requirements 
in many  mundane  respects has  become  so sharp as  to make  delay 
more  and  more  difficult to bear.  men  and  women  will no  longer 
accept the old inequalities and  inadequacies. -~-
Economic  infrastructure and  protection of  the  environment 
In  addition  to social provision  there  are  two  further sets of 
communal  requirements  which  in general  the  market  has  proved  unable 
to  meet.  These  are  the  elements  in  the  economic  infrastructure -
among  them  transport  servic~ communications  and  some  sources  of  energy  -
and  the  elements  of  a  satisfactory environment  - such  as  fresh  water,  pure 
air,  freedom  from  noise  and  congestion.  Both  these sets of  communal 
requirements  must  be  met  if society is to  develop  in a  balanced  and 
healthy  way. 
The  importance  of  the transport services  for  European  integration 
has  been  recognised since  the  foundation  of  the  EEC;  but  progress  in 
developing  a  co-ordinated system  has  been  less  rapid  than  was  hoped. 
It is becoming  necessary  to  consider this subject on  a  wider basis; 
since  a  series of important  technological possibilities will influence 
the  ways  in which  European  transport services  develop,  llihat  is the 
scope  of  advanced  passenger  trains?  of hovercraft and  hover-trains? 
of  a  vertical  and  short take-off aircraft system for  Europe?,  What 
moreover  are  the likely effects of  developments  in telecommunications 
and  computers  upon  the future  transport  requirements  of  Europe?  For 
example  do  such  developments  presage  such  fundamental  changes  in,  for 
example,  the  organisation of  a  large office or in  the relationships in 
space  between  a  controller and  the operations  he  is controlling as  to 
affect the  problem  of  commuter  traffic in large cities?  Again,  what 
are  the future  requirements  of  Europe  likely  to  be  in respect  of 
telecommunications  services  themselves? 
At  any  rate, it appears  that in  the  economic  infrastructure 
we  are  concerned  with  a  class  of  communal  requirement  where  central 
pla~ning and  decision are  likely to be  required  more  urgently 
than  in  the  field of social provision.  The  sums  of  money  required 
for  research and  development  will  be  very  large;  decisions  in 
respect of  the  various  aspects  of  communications  can  hardly  be 
/taken -35-
taken in isolation from  one  another.  The  concentration of 
population  and  transport facilities in Western  Europe  is so 
great  that it would  be  virtually impossible  for  the  countries 
to  take  their decisions  upon  future  communications  issues 
separately. 
The  problem  of  the  protection of  the  environment  has  come 
more  recently  and  more  rapidly  to  the  centre of  public 
attention.  Pollution of  water  and  air,  together  with 
excessive  noise,  congestion  and  strain,  have  come  to  be 
recognised  as  undesirable  consequences  of rapid  economic  growth, 
Already  the  outlines of  a  policy  have  been  set out in the first 
Communicati~n Qf  the  Commission  on  the  Community's  Policy for  the 
Environment.  A co-ordinated effort of  great  dimensions  will  be 
needed  partly because  of  the  size of  the  problem,  partly because 
many  of  the  problems  of  the  environment  of  their nature  involve 
the disregard of  national frontiers,  and  partly because  the 
requirements  upon  industry  to  apply standards  which  ensure  non-
polluting products  will  not  be  imposed  speedily  and  effectively 
at a  national  level if they  seem  likely to  put  the  manufacturers 
of the  country  concerned at a  relative disadvantage.  HenGe  it 
is clear  that in this sphere  the  instructions of  the  Community 
will  play  a  substantial part. 
Space  does  not  allow  the  requirements  of  the  economic 
infrastructure or environmental  protection to  be  discussed at length 
especially in view  of  the  degree  to which  they  are  covered in other 
papers;  but in a  consideration of communal  requirements  the prob-
lems  to  which  they  give  rise must  be  borne  in mind  along  with  those 
raised by  the  needs  of  expanded social provision. -36-
The  implications  for  industry 
An  examination  of  the  main  fields  of  communal  requirement 
involves  the  need  for  the  maintenance  and  indeed  the  acceleration 
of industrial growth.  This  renders  more  possible both  the  diversion 
of  a  greater share  of real  resources  to education,  health,  he  ing 
and  social  welfare  andprogress  in  redistribution of  ~endable income. 
It must  however  be  growth  conforming  to  new  conditions  - especially 
in respect  of  avoidance  of  pollution of  the  environment  and  con-
sistent with  regional  development  -and directed  to  new  ends. 
The  allocation of  resources  of manpower,  capital  and  managerial 
skill between  various  purposes is constantly  changing.  It is not 
possible save  in the most  general way  to  indicate  how  the size of 
various  industries may  be  expected  to change  in the  next  ten  years, 
given policies pursued  throughout  the  Community  which  emphasise 
greater social provision and  more  attention  to  the  improvement  of 
the  economic  infrastructure and  of  the  environment.  Redistribution 
of  income  will mean  expansion  of industries  producing  consumer  goods-
foodstuffs,  clothing,  furniture and  domestic  equipment; larger 
programmes  of school  building and  house  building ~nd renewa] together with 
extended hospital  and  health centre provision  may  tend  to  change 
the  emphasis  in the  building industry  from  industrial ·and  commercial 
construction;  an  expansion  of health,  educational  and  welfare 
services will necessitate  the  training of  a  higher  pro~ortion of 
teachers,  doctors  and  medical  and  social auxiliary  workers.  These 
however  are  no  more  than  obvious  trends  whic~ can  at present  ~e 
indicated in the  broadest  way  and  which  are likely to be  manifest 
at the  national  rather  than  the  Community  level. 
One  key  - if not  the  key  - to  changes  in  the  rate  and  direction 
of economic  growth  is  to  be  found  in  technolcgical  advance;  and  it 
is by  new  directions  for  technological  advance  that a  programme  of 
emphasis  on  communal  requitgments  is likely to  be  assisted. -37-
At  present however  there is a  scepticism about  technology as 
! 
profound  as  the scepticism about  growth.  As  with  growth  the 
criticism should be  directed not against  technology  but rather 
against  the  way  in which  it has  been  used. 
Much  research  and  development  is of  course privately and  not 
publicly financed.  Indeed  company  financed  research and  develop-
ment  has  consistently  grown  because it can  contribute  to  economic 
success.  When  all research and  development,  however  financed,  is 
taken  into account  the  predominance  which  is now  being  assumed  by 
spending on  purposes  other  than  defence  and  prestige can  be  seenf 
Percentage of  Gross  National  Expenditure  on 
Research  &  Development  by !Ddo  Ob iectives (1967) 
Belgium 
France 
Germany 
Italy 
Netherlands 
UK 
Denmark 
Ireland 
Norway 
USA 
National Security 
and  Prestige 
5 
41 
21 
16 
4 
30 
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ll 
55 
Economic 
Development 
68 
43 
62 
60 
70 
56 
59 
84 
58 
32 
During  the fifties and  early sixties much  of 
Public 
Welfare 
11 
5 
7 
10 
10 
5 
17 
5 
12 
6 
Other 
16 
11 
10 
13 
15 
9 
16 
11 
19 
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the  emphasis  in 
technological progress  - partie tarly as  measured  by  the expenditure 
on  publicly financed  research and  development  - was,  in almost all 
advanced  countries,  on  projects which  contributed little to meeting 
human  needs;  the emphasis  was  on  defence,  space  and  nuclear projects. 
By  the  end  of  the sixties however  it had  come  to be  put  to a  greater 
extent on  economic,  agricultural,  welfare,  environmental  and  similar 
purposes. 
1rigures extracted from  table  in paper  The  Goals  of  Research  and 
Development  in  the  l970s  {published by  Science  Policy  Unit  of 
University of Sussex 1971)  based  on  DECO  Statistics 1971. -38-
The  shaping  of  industrial  development  which  social considerations 
require will  be  assisted by  continuing  the  change  in emphasis  of 
Research  and  Development  towards  satisfaction of  genuine  consumer  needs 
and  the  promotion  of  welfare,  safety  and  environmental  improvement. 
To  some  degree  the  Research  and  Development  effort in private  industry  -
as  exemplified particularly  by  the  work  of  Research  Associations  - already 
takes  account  of  these  needs;  but  not  yet  to  a  sufficient degree. 
It is unlikely  th2t  the  ch~nge in  emphasis  will  be  effected by 
normal  market  forces.  The  interests of  consumers  are  generally  too 
weakly  organised  for  this;  and  indeed  in  a  number  of  cases,  as  already 
indicated,  there is not  yet  nor  is  there  likely  to  be  a  sufficiently 
clear  consumer  demand  expressed  through  the  normal  forces  of  the  market. 
The  change  of  emphasis  in industrial  development  and  growth  which  a 
programme  of  meeting  communal  needs  necessitates  will  depend  on  the  use 
of  collective  regul~tion and  initiative.  Methods  of  public  procurement 
will have  to  be  used  to  further  the direction of  Research  and  Development 
towards  projects specially  addressed  to  the  needs  of  lower  income  groups 
and  to other social aims.  Similarly positive  ~ublic action by  the 
planning  of  Research  and  Development  contracts will  be  necessary  to 
~ecure increasing attention  to  1-roblems  of  communal  needs.  In  some  cases 
this  will  involve  national  action;  but in other fields  close  technological 
:a-operation on  a  Community  basis  - which  has  so  far  made  relatively 
little progress  - will  be  required. 
To  these  subjects  the  proposals  for  the  creation of  Community 
:ndustrial  Development  Contracts  are  very  relevant.  Such  contracts are 
1ot  a  substitute for the efforts of  industrialists or of  separate member 
;tates.  They  can,  however,  as at present envisaged,  serve  one  of  two 
urposes.  The  first is that of  providing  developmer.t  with  the  aim  of 
aising efficiency in industry  - particularly in  the  sense  of  industrial 
a-operation  and  integration between  the  countries  of  the  Community  -
nd  facilitating its adaptation  to  the social aims  of  economic 
/development -~-
develApment;  the  second  that of promoting  development  projects 
related to goods  or equipment  which  will meet  a  public need  -
defined at Community  level - but which  are not  produced in 
l  response  to market  forces  alone. 
1see  Memorandum  on  the Creation of  Community  Industrial  Develop-
ment  Contracts,  E.E.C.  Brussels 15.10.1971. -40-
Elements  in a  Social Strategy 
The  foregoing  sections suggest  that to assist the achievement 
of  the objectives quoted  from  the  Third Medium  Term  Programme  will 
require  a  willingness  to  change  attitudes,  adopt  new  policies  and 
modify  institutions.  It will  require  a  new  consciousness  of  the 
intimate  ways  in which  social and  industrial policy continuously 
interact.  It will  require  the maintenance,  even  the acceleration, 
of economic  growth;  but  a  radical  change  in  the  ways  in which  the 
results of  that economic  growth  are put  to  use. 
(1)  The  occepted objectives in  the major  fields  of social policy -
education,  health,  housing,  welfare,  social security and  distribution 
of  income  - need  to be  reviewed  (even  where  the objectives are at 
present implied rather  than explicit ones)  so  that an  assessment  may 
be  made  of  how  far  the  progress envisaged over  the  next  ten years  is 
adequate.  Such  a  reassessment must  embrace  not only  an  examination 
of  how  far  the  resources  which  are at present explicitly or implicity 
earmarked  for  these  purposes  are adequate  ~r should be  larger, but 
also  an  examination  of  the principles on  which  these  resources  are 
to  be  used.  Thus  in education,  to  take  an  example,  it is not merely 
a  question of asking  whether  the  expected rate of enrolment in 1980 
is large  enough  but also whether  within  the  programme  of educational 
expansion  enough  emphasis  is put on  the  diminution of present 
inqualities of opportunity. 
(2)  The  objective must  be  a  clear one  - that in fram!ng  future 
policies  the emphasis  be  put  not  on  growth  for its own  sake,  nor  on 
the  enhancement  of prestige,but on  the  creation of a  society which  is 
genuinely  designed  to cater for  individual  human  needs  and  to  give 
the fullest scope  for  individual  human  development. 
(3)  Some  of  the  work  of reassessment must  be  done  in industry 
itself.  Here  the  most  important steps  are  the encouragement  of  a 
higher living standard  for  workers  and  of greater influence  by  them 
~ the  control of  their  wor~ing lives.  A striking  fe~ture of 
/advanced ' 
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advanced  industrialised societies over  the last fifteen  to  twenty 
years,  no  less  than  of  the  developing societies,  has  been  the 
"revolution of rising expectations".  Men  and  women  are constantly 
reminded  of  the advances  of science  and  technology;  they  are 
subjected more  systematically  than ever  before  to sophisticate• 
advertisement pressure  - particularly in those  countries  which  have 
commercial  radio  and  television - designed  to encourage  them  to 
acquire  a  wider  and  wider  range  of  goods.  .It is hardly surprising 
therefore that they  should expect  to see science and  technology 
making  possible a  standard of living which  improves  in  real  terms 
year  by  year. 
(4)  In  order  that this desire  may  be  articulated and  construct-
ively expressed all practical steps should be  taken  to  encourage 
the development  of trade unions  and  their recognition by  employers. 
The  primary  drive in this direction must  of course come  from  the 
tr~de unions  themselves.  Since  the most  satisfactory way  of con-
ducting industrial relations is on  the basis of collective 
bargaining between  employers  on  the one  hand  and  strong representative 
trade  unions  on  the other,  trade  union  organisation should be 
facilitated end  employers  encouraged  to  accord  recognition.  Unions 
should also be  ensured a  wore  substantial position vis  a  vis  the 
for.nal  European institutions and  in appropriate  ways  the principle 
accepted that workers  should have  through their unions  a  place in 
industrial affairs which  assures  them  an  effective influence on  the 
whole  range of matters  with which  industry is concerned. 
(5)  In  the field of social policy  a  greater emphasis  should be 
placed on  the  involvement of the public in all matters of concern 
to  them  - consideration of plans  for  the development  of particular 
areas;  adminis~ration of hospitals and  other health institutions; 
participation by  parents  and  teachers  in  the  reshaping of education; 
and  so  on. -42-
(6)  The  social purpose  of  industry will  be  strengthened if more 
attention is given  to protection of  the  consumer;  not  only  by 
legislation and  inspection where  that is necessary,  but by  the 
encouragement of organisations of consumers  who  may  establish or 
control facilities for  the  testing and  evaluation of  consumer  products. 
(7)  A profound  influence  can  be  exerted on  industry and  society  by 
the  change  of emphasis  of  research  and  development.  The  US  declaration 
in the early sixties that it would  before  the seventies place a  man 
on  the  moon  caught public  imagination  and  provided  the  spur  for  an 
immense  programme  of  research  and  technological  application.  There 
is much  to  be  said for  a  Community  commitment  to a  series of equally 
bold declarations about  goals  to be  achieved  by  given dates in  the 
future.  Such  goals  however  must  be  ones  much  more  clearly related 
to human  needs  or  to  environmental  improvement- designed,  for  example,to 
achieve  a  given  housing  target throughout  the  Community  or  to free 
all its waterways  of pollution.  Such  commitments  have  dangers  since 
they  may  divert effort and  resources  from  other equally  valuable 
purposes;  but a  balanced programme  of such  declared social and 
environmental  goals,  always  provided  thot their human  purpose  was 
clear 1  could give  a  focus  to  technological  and  social  aspirations. 
(8)  As  a  counterpart to such  a  declaration of  goals  therE  would 
be  eq~al advantage  in establishing at Community  level  an  institution -
as  recommended  in  the  OECO  Report  ''Science,  Growth  and  Society"  -
which  "would  be  responsible  for  anticipating the likely effects, 
threatening or beneficial,  of  technological  initiatives and  de"alopments". 
(9)  There  are  gaps  in social policy and  administration which  could 
be  identified and  filled.  In  respect of sickness,  unemployment  snd 
pensions,  events  may  force  a  greater degree  of simplification and 
uniformity  to  reduce  the  complexity  of accounting.  Attention needs 
to  be  given  both  to  the  possibility of  provision  being comprehensive, 
covering all inhabitants  of  ~he Community  and  filling any  gaps  in 
coverage;  and  to  the  degree  to  which  the  financing  of  such  schemes 
/by -~-
by  a  greater contribution  from  general  t~xation, along  with  the 
contribution income  from  employers  and  employees,  can  have  a 
valuable  redistribution effect. 
(10)  In  education,  health and  housing  professional qualifications 
need  to be  harmonised.  The  "-eximum  exchange  of  information  between 
countries of  the  Community  can lead  to better definition of  aims  in 
these fields  of social policy  and  evolution of  the  best methods  of 
achieving  them.  This  can lay  the basis  for  general  advance  and  pro-
gressive harmonisation.  The  appropriate institutions of  the  Community 
can  play initially  a  co-ordinating role but will increasingly  them-
selves stimulate improvement. 
(ll)  Special  importance attaches to educational advance  and  the 
concept of lifelong education.  This  relates also to  the need  to 
ensure adequate industrial progremmes  of  training - and  of retraining 
as  the needs  of industry change.  The  success  of programmes  of 
vocational and  general education in adult life will substantially 
depend  on  industry  recoonising the  need  to co-operate in releasing 
and  reabsorbing men  and  women  in accordance with such  programmes. 
(12)  The  industrial policy will require institutions of  the 
Community  with powers  of supervision and initiative.  The  form  or 
these institutions - and  ~ow far  those  already existing can be 
adapted for this purpose  - will require examination.  It will, 
however,  beassential for such institutions to have  the confidence 
of and  involve  the participation of  the social partners. -44-
Chapter  IV  of  the  document  Preliminary  Guidelines  for  a 
Community  Social  Policy  Programme  discusses  thescope  for  the 
implementation of such  a  policy  through  the  institutions of  the  Community 
and  the  ways  in which  financial  resources  can  be  made  available.  It 
also sets out a  programme  of priorities which  provide  a  basis  for 
discussion  and  decision.  Immediate  steps  can  best be  determined in 
the  context  of  action  to  draw  up  a  Social  Budget  of  the  Community  and 
to for•ulate  as speedily  as  possible a  "medium  term  social  forecast" 
at Community  level. 
So  far  as  other priorities set out in  the  document  are  concerned 
greater emphasis  might  well  be  given  to  the  following  points -
(a)  the  importance  of  regional  planni~g and  of full 
employment  policies as  a  means  of ensuring  the spread  of employ  ant 
opportunities  and  the  minimisation of such movement  of  workers  as 
may  have  detrimental  personal  or  family  consequences; 
(b)  the achievement  of  higher  real wage  standards  and  better working 
conditions  (together  with  the  identification of  areas  of  low  pay  and 
poor  working  conditions)  by  the  encouragement  of collective bargaining 
over  a  wide  range  of  subjects; 
(c) in connection with  improvement  of health and  safety standards  a 
consideration of  the effects of  work  of  a  repetitive and  monotonous 
char~cter; 
(d)  improvement  not  only  of  working  conditions  and relative 
remuneration  of  women  but study  of  the ways  in which  their  opportun~ties, 
particularly in  the  field of  education  should  be  widened.· 
(e) measures  far  promoting  the  integration of  handicapped 
people  into active  lif~ to  be  seen  not merely  in  terms  of  possible 
employment  - important  though  that is - but  also  ~n terms  of  the 
most  rewarding  human  contacts  and  constructive  community  care  for 
all categories of  handicapped  and  disabled; 
(f) steps  to  identify  gro~ps and  areas  where  for  any  reasons  the 
provision of  health care,  educational  facilities  and  social security 
arrangements fall  belcw  the  general  s~~  .. uard; -45-
{g)  consideration of  the possiole  announcement  of goals  in 
the field of social and  human  improvement  for  which  dates might 
be  fixed so  that the emphasis  of  technological  advance  end  social 
administration on  the meeting of  human  needs  can be  the more 
clearly seen. "The  changing  collective and  individual needs  of European 
society" 
Paper  read by Dr.  Giorgio Ruffolo,  Secretary-General 
for Planning in the Italian Ministry of  the Budget 
and Economic Planning 
at the 
Conference  on  "Industry and Society in the Community" 
Venice,  20th-22nd April 1972. 1. 
2. 
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Economic  growth  and  the  quality  of life 
One  of  the  most distinguished casualties of  May 
1968  was  undoubtedly  the  G~~ (gross national product)  (1) 
This  idol  of economic  success,  which  was  burned in the 
squares of Faris,  has  since been  rehabilitated as far 
as possible, but it is no  longer the  same.  Faith  in the 
rallen god has been  shaken.  The  optimistic belief in 
economic  growth  which  has marked  the last twenty years, 
is now  giving way  to  equally uncritical  and mystical 
pessisism. 
In twenty years,  national product per capita has 
doubled  in the  countries  of the European Economic 
Community.  If the  quantity or goods  produced  were  a 
true indicator of social well-being,  we  should 
now  be  living in a  Europe  twice  as prosperous  and  twice 
as happy. 
This is not  so.  European  industrial  society, 
shaped  by  twenty years  of  economic progress is 
incomparably more  affluent tnan  the  society which 
emerged  in confusion from  the ruins of the  war;  but it is 
nv  longer human  01•  rew&rding. 
The  economic progress of Western Europe has  been 
(1)  I  prefer to  use  the English initials.  Every religion 
has its own  jargon. -3-
enormous  in many  respects.  For  twenty years  the 
EEC  countries have  maintained  something like a  55·~ 
growth rate in their national product;  in comparison, 
the United Kingdom's figure  of~' which would 
have  seemed  miraculous during  the  inter-war years, 
is almost  shameful.  Almost full employment 
has been achieved in virtually every country. 
The  real income  of workers has  increased by  an 
annual average  of  around  7%.  There  has also 
been a  considerable measure  of stability:  the 
general level of prices has  risen on average by 
about  3.5%  per annum,  There  have  however been 
steeper increases over  the last few  years. 
From  the  economic  standpoint,  the last twenty 
years have been a  golden age for  the Continent. 
Between 1968  and  1970,  however,  the  spectres 
of a  forgotten past have  reappeared on the horizon. 
They  include inflation,  the  international monetary 
crisis,  and  the upsurge of social unrest.  A 
feeling  of malaise  is disturbing men's  consciences 
and is casting doubts  on the experts optimistic 
forecasts for the next ten years which are presented 
as a  mirror image  of  the last decade (1). 
(1)  Recent OECD  forecasts  anticipate increases of  5.2% 
for the "small"  Community,  3.~ for  the United Kingdom, 
4.2%  for  the United States but lo%  for Japan. -4-
The  econometricians  are  therefore  neither 
~orried nor wildly optimi.stic.  Not  so  the man 
in the  street who  is beginning to wonder what  these 
indices and  t·igure  s  I'e ally mean. 
At  the end  of:  last year  ( 2),  the Economist 
:gublished  a  semi-serious table.  The  chief countries 
of  the world were  ranked  in a  single list based  on 
twelve  social  indicators,  which~were -either "P.ositive
11 
(e.g.  the  percentage~or seventeen-year-olds still at 
school)  or "negative"  (e.g.  the  pel
1centage  o:f  road 
deaths). 
Among  European countries,  the United Kingdom  had 
the  highest  social  ratin;~ ( +8)  but the  lov1est  economic 
performance (0);  at the  other end  of'  the  scale, Itnly 
had  the  highest  economic rating ( + 7)  but  the  lowest 
social  perEormance  (-15). 
It goes without  sa~ying that  thes~ rigures 
8re srbitrary and  misleading (particularly in this 
semi-serious :rox·m  o:r  generalisation).  I  shall  re  tu1'ln 
to this point later in my  paper.  At  the  same  time, 
1t cnnnot be  disputed that  tb e  national  accounts  are 
becoming  an  increas~ngly unrGliable  indicatol'l  of 
pros~erity and  even more  so  o~ happiness.  While 
Pigou' s  "la'au  that general  nell-being· increases with 
economic prosnerity 
( r' 
~)  25th December  1971 -5-
could  reasonably be accepted in times  of general  economic 
scarcity,  this proposition becomes  increasingly 
doubtfUl when,  as more  goods  are  produced,  more  of 
other kinds  have  to be  made  to  remedy  the damage 
caused by the first,  and the process  continues in a 
sequence which seriously threatens  the  sources  of human 
life and  the  mental  stability of  all mankind. 
In short,  the  outward  signs of  economic well-being 
are  increasingly offset by signs of social ills. 
It is quite useless to  aSk whether  the ills 
of our  society are greater or less  than those  of 
the African races,  who  are not  exposed  to pollution, 
or of the  country-dwellers of the 18th century,  who 
were  not a  prey to mental  illness. 
Every society has its own  special  troubles.  No 
weighted  index has yet been invented which  can measure 
them in absolute  terms.  In every  society there  are  those 
who  regard  such evils as  the necessary  and  even 
acceptable cost (1)  of the attendant,  overriding and 
inherent advantages (Paradise  or the GNP);  on  the 
other hand there are  those who  seek to  reduce  and  combat 
these evils. 
( 1)  In this connection,  see  the "open enthusiasm"  for  the 
happy  contusion of Las Vegas,  attacked by Maldonado  in 
"La speranza progettuale", Turin,  1970,  pp.  114 et seq. 4. 
( 1) 
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All  the ills of modern  industrial society  can 
be  traced  to  a  single  common  factor  - uncontrollable 
development.  Industrial society  bas  achieved  the 
incredible tour de  force  of continuously increasing 
the  technical  and  economic  resources at its 
disposal.  It has  not  yet succeeded  in planning 
this growth deliberately or rationally. 
The  evidence  of this  shortcoming is now 
obvious in the Western Europe  of the  seventies. 
First and  foremost,  Europe  seems  to be  incapable 
of  spreading economic growth evenly  over its various 
regions  and  of narrowing  the  gap  between  the different 
levels of  society. 
Over  the last twenty years of  economic  growth, 
the  inequalities between  the different  regions of Europe 
have  unquestionably increased.  Despite  the efforts made 
particularly in Italy and  the  United Kingdom  to help 
Southern Italy,  and  Northern Ireland and Scotland 
respectively,  these peripheral  regions are still 
depressed.  To  a  lesser extent, all the  areas  to  the 
west,  east and  south  of  the "golden quadritateraltt  bounded 
by Milan, Paris,  the Midlands  and the Ruhr (1)  have  lost 
and  are still losing economic  importance  to these high-pressure 
areas.  There  is still a  large dose  of unhealthy laissez-faire 
in the location of economic activity. 
See J. Pinder.  Economic Growth,  Social Justice and 
Political Reform  in AA.  vv  Europe  to-morrow,  1972. -7-
It is obvious that,  so long as firms  are  completely 
free  in the matter of location,  the  tendency  to 
concentrate will become  even  stronger and the  economic 
and  social  imbalances between  the  various regions  of the 
Continent will become  worse. 
As  regards  incomes,  it would  seem  that the  trend 
towards  a  fairer distribution which marked  the  period 
from  1920  to about 1950,  was  halted shortly afterwards (2). 
In a  world where  all incomes are rising,  everyone 
has higher aspirations and  social differences become 
more  and more  frustrating.  This situation is perhaps 
less immediately explosive  than  a  sharp division 
between a  few well-to-do  and masses of poor;  but 
there  is more  "creeping"  social  jealousy,  encouraged 
by  the  continuous  stimulus  af  advertisements  and  the 
powerful  example  af  ostentatious consumption. 
The  final  consequence is that poverty,  which has 
ceased to be  general,  is now  concentrating in 
intractable social areas,  many  of which  are  the 
preserve  of foreigners  and  immigrants. 
It would  seem  that the richest societies 
cannot do 
(2) J. Tinbergen, Population,  ibid.  page  74 -8-
without these ghettoes where  the  rejects of prosperity 
accumulate. 
5.  Huge  city growth is another manifestation of 
the entropy and  of the  high degree  of disorder and 
disorganisation which accompany uncontrolled development. 
No  matter how  this phenomenon is plotted on the 
map  of Europe (golden quadrilateral, Lotharingian axis), 
North-West Europe is unquestionably becoming  a  densely-
populated "strong 11  area,  with a  marked  tendency towards 
faster city growth. 
The  conurbations of  the Midlands  and South-East 
in England,  round Paris in France,  in Rhineland-Westphalia 
and  along  the Rhine in Germany,  in Switzerland and  in 
North-West Italy form  a  potential European megalopolis, 
with a  population which has already reached  about 
150  million.  This very-densely populated area 
(about 460  persons per square km.  already)  forms  the 
most powerfUl magnet  to both population and economic 
resources in Europe.  If its power of attraction is 
nat  reduced,  the European megalopolis of the future 
w111 be  tbe  undoubted  equal of similar concentrations 
in Japan and along the north-east seaboard of the 
United States (1). 
It is estimated that 30%  of the population of 
the European Economic Community is to-day concentrated 
in ~  of  1 ts area. 6. 
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If the present  trend  continues,  this figure 
is likely to rise to 4Cffo  by 1990.  Quite apart from 
the  gradual decay of population and  of economic 
growth  in the areas outside  the "megalopolis", 
to which  reference has  already been made,  this would 
mean  increasing congestion and  a  decline in the 
quality of urban life inside  the metropolitan area. 
On  any objective view,  living conditions in 
our cities are being  increasingly dominated by  the 
workings of an absurd fate.  The  facts,  for· example, 
that streets are being increasingly used to park 
vehicles instead of a  means  of  speedy  and  comfortable 
transport,  that  the cost of such parking is rising 
continuously (it has been estimated that the 
capital outlay for each parking space is about 70 
million lire)  and  that,  despite all this, motor 
vehicle  sales are still rising rapidly,  are  symptomatic 
of how  the public are losing control of  their cities. 
(1)  See  "Vers une  'megalopolis'  europeene?  in D.P.  No.  43  (11-71) 
See  also "CEE:  Travaux du groupe  1985-2000  - Urbanisation' 
May  1971,  and Phlipponeaux :  "The  environment in Europe 
to-morro~'  op.  cit. 
There  is an even greater danger of men  losing 
control over their environment.  The  n snare of entropy'' 
as Kenneth Boulding calls it, is perhaps less apparent -10-
in Europe,  which now  depends  on  the  other 
continents for most  of its raw materials.  But 
the  trapdoor of pollution is already open. 
The  broad stream  of history down  the 
centre  of Lorraine has  already  transformed  the 
gold  of  its legends into mud.  The  same  threat 
hangs  over the Mediterranean  coast.  The  still green 
forests of  the North menaced  by  the  spread of  the 
urban fungus.  What  is more,  vast areas which  are 
abandoned by an over-hasty agricultural  industry,  are 
invaded  every week  end by people from  the cities,  who 
are  trying to get away  and  leave behind  them  the 
fumes,  dirt and din of the  city. 
There  are,  of course,  some  people  who  laugh 
at those  who  talk of ecological disaster and  say 
that  this is a  new  form  of milennary pessimism  as 
the year  2000  draws  near.  Or  that it is the 
aristocracy again expressing its contempt for mass 
democracy. 
In other words,  the battle for  the environment, 
as for  the nuclear  threat - which is now  out  of 
fashion - is between hawks  and doves. 
One  side argues  that progress must  have  its 
way;  the  other forms pressure  groups  and calls for 
bans. 
But  organised planning of environmental 
resources,  laying down  the  terms  of a  balanced 
solution,  is still in its infancy. 7o 
B. 
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The  lack of balance in the  economy,  the location 
of industry,  city growth  and  the  environment is 
closely linked with the fUndamental  political imbalance 
of industrial  society,  whose  institutions are  incapable 
of meeting its desire  to participate. 
the real nub  of  our social ills. 
This  is 
Economic  growth has itself created  the  demand  to 
participate through  the  unprecedented mobilisation 
of  social forces;  of young people,  enrolled for 
mass education,  of women,  now  semi-emancipated from 
the  home,  of citizens, flung  together in huge  urban 
concentrations,  of workers,  exposed  to  the  stresses 
of continuously-changing processes  and  the  uncertainties 
of mobility. 
It is only a  half-truth to interpret this demand 
for participation as a  demand  for social  services. 
This is only a  partial statement of the issue.  There 
is a  danger of  presenting  tre  problem as  one  of 
reallocating economic resources between private 
consumption  and  the  satisfaction of collective needs 
(which can be  solved by raising taxes for example) 
and not  as  a  problem  of  structures and  the distribution 
of power in the  community.  This brings me  to  the 
heart of my  subject. 
The  growth  of social expenditure 
Galbraith's ideas are well known.  He  argues that 
in a  situation where  economic  resources are relatively -12-
abundant,  we  continue  to live as in conditions of 
scarcity,  and  give  the production of goods  arxi 
services for the  market - for  the  satisfaction of 
our personal needs  - a  priority which they have 
lost, now  that everyone lives above  the  subsistence 
level;  we  ignore  our  higher needs,  predominantly 
of  a  collective nature, which  cannot be  satisfied 
by goods produced for sale but only by social services 
organised by  the State.  The  result is the  paradox 
of public  squalor in the midst of private afrluence, 
and  this affluence is the more  illusory the more  it 
is based  on  the  invention of non-existent needs  and 
useless frivolities. 
This happens because,  in our market economy, 
goods  which  can be  sold to the public have  a  strategic 
advantage,  since  their market price automatically 
provides  the  income  which  tt commands  labour,  capital 
and  raw  materials for production"  (1) 
( 1) J. Galbraith,  "The Affluent societytt,  1958 page  320. 
Failing outside intervention, private production 
can therefore monopolise all the market's  available 
resources.  To  prevent this from  happening  and  to make 
some  of these resources available for public services, 
laws  have  to be  passed and  institutions independent 
of the production process  have  to be  set up. -13-
In other words,  the  market  is the rule and State 
intervention is the  exception. 
In these  circumstances,  the  supply of public 
services cannot compete with the  supply of private 
goods  and  services.  A "Social imbalance"  is created 
between  the number  of cars produced and  the  space 
available for  them,  between tourist services and  road 
safety and  so on.  The  imbalance  is aggravated by 
the fact that the coefficients linking private 
consumption and  public services are  tending to  rise~ 
Galbraith's problem is to build into the  system 
some  kind of machinery to restore  structural balance; 
for example,  "a taxation system which will automatically 
make  a  percentage  of increased earnings available to 
the  authorities for public use". 
But is the problem  of  social ills in an  affluent 
society really a  matter of  increasing taxation to meet 
the  demand  for  goods  and  services for collective use; 
or in other words  of increasing social expenditure  to 
meet  social  demand~  Or does it depend  on  the logically 
preliminary,  and politically more  complex,  problem of 
creating social demand? 
Before  trying to answer this question,  we  must 
first consider the relationship between  the  growth of 
social expenditure  and  of  the  gross national  product. 
Figures taken from  a  study made  by  the 
Centro Studi  e  Piani Economic!  (Economic Research -14-
and Planning Centre)  on  the  trend of social expenditure 
in a  number  of industrialised countries will be  found  in 
the appendix. 
Some  of the  terms  used  require  a  brief explanation. 
Public investment means  gross fixed capital formation 
as  normally used  in Government  accounts.  Public  consumption 
is also  the concept  used in the  national  accounts. 
However,  while  housing is reckoned  as  a  public service, 
both because public management  and  financing of 
housing  are  increasing in many  countries  and because 
of the purpose  of  the  service,  a  new  aggTegate  has 
been introduced;  in the  classification used for 
the Italian economic plan it is defined as  the 
social uses  of  income. 
The  concept  of public interest will,  however, 
have  to be further expanded  to  allow for  current 
appropriations  of  income  for  social purposes (contributions 
to health services,  insurance  payments,  etc.)  with 
the  inclusion of  such  transfers,  we  arrive at the 
concept  of social expenditure.  This gives an  idea 
of  the  overall resources mobilised in a  particular 
country  to  meet predominantly social  needs,  as 
distinct from  individual requirements  or directly 
productive  investments.  Incidentally,  under  the 
heading ar  It social expenditure"'  the distinction 
between  consumption  and  investment  losesmuch  of its 
significance. -15-
The  figures in the appendix clearly show  that from 
1959  to 1969  social expenditure  tended to rise faster 
than  the gross national  product in virtually all the 
countries studied,  the  share of social expenditure 
in national  income  rose from  32  to 43%  in the Netherlands, 
31  to  41%  in Sweden,  34  to  39.%  in France,  34  to  3Bro  in 
West Germany,  31  to 38.%  in Italy, 30  to 36.%  in Belgium, 
27  to  35%  in No~vay, 31  to  34%  in the United States, 
27  to 32%  in the United Kingdom  and  24  to  29%  in Denmark. 
In Japan only,  the figure  remained practically unchanged 
at around  2Zb. 
The  tendency of social expenditure  to rise faster 
than  income  extends,  in general,  to all components  of 
the  aggregate i.e. public investment,  public consumption, 
housing (and,  therefore, "social uses")  _and  current 
appropriations.  Elasticity is almost  always greater 
than 1. 
While  aggregates of  this kind,  covering such a  short 
period,  cannot be regarded as highly significant,  they 
do  indicate a  clear tendency to channel more  resources 
to  the provision  of  social goods  and  services. 
This would  suggest that the real problem is not 
the appropriation of resources from  individual  to 
collective uses but rather the way  those  resources 
are  employed.  The  expansion  of  social expenditure 
derives its impetus from  the  same  source  as. the -16-
growth  or private  consumption.  But this expansion is 
so  chaotic,  unplanned  and  subordinate  to "private"  demand, 
that costs in terms  of  resources used per unit of service 
provided are rising  and  the  quality of the  service is 
tending to deteriorate as its scale increases. 
The  quantitative growth  of  social expenditure 
conceals  a  rise in its costs instead of reflecting an 
improvement  in  the  quality of  the  service  provided. 
10.  The  uncontrolled growth of cities,  as  a  result 
of decisions left mainly to private enterprise,  involves 
rising social costs for building and  transport. 
It has been estimated, for  example,  that if the 
trend  tov1ards  urban concentration which  has  marked  the 
last twenty years  continues,  the rate of building 
will have  to be doubled from  1  to  about  2  million 
dwellings per year  over the next  twenty years in the 
countries of the European Economic Community. 
The  educational  system  has felt the impact of 
industry's demand for skilled workers  and  of  the 
entry of massive  new  waves  of students,  due  to the 
increase  in personal  incomes.  In every country in 
Europe,  expenditure  on education has risen steadily 
by  an  average  of more  than  lo%  per annum.  Numbers 
at school  have  increased.  But both fixed  costs and 
current expenditure  on  education have  grown faster  than 
the  service provided.  To  judge from  recent experiences, 
moreover,  education cannot be  said  to  be  greatl  "enjoyed" 
in most European  countries. -17-
Much  the  same  may  be said of  the health services. 
In Western Europe,  all forms  of  expenditure on  these 
services have risen swiftly almost everywhere {direct 
payments or appropriations and  the overall percentage is 
now  somewhere  between 5  and  lo%  of national income.  Here 
again,  the  increase  cannot be said to  have been deliberately 
planned on  the  basis of research into the state of health 
and  the needs of  the population, but rather a  hasty and 
anguished response  to pressure from private demand,  the 
general public and  the medical  profession.  In every 
country,  the  cost of healih  services is rising to  a 
greater or lesser extent. 
On  the other hand,  expenditure  on  conservation and 
urban reconstruction is still on  a  very small scale.  There 
is no basic pressure from "privatett  demaro  to give  the 
necessary impetus;  and,  like other races  and peoples 
thr~ughout the world, Europeans  seem  so far to have  taken 
an implicit decision to let their geography  and history 
go  by the board. 
I  think it is fair to  say that social expenditure 
bas  been  increasing  and will continue  to do  so,  not  in 
opposition to  the growth  of "private"  demand,  but  as 
an  indirect and  minor  consequence  of  that growth. 
The  real problem is not  how  much  money  must be diverted 
to  collective needs by more  automatic  tax deductions. 
The  enormous  resources mobilised for building homes  and 
for  the  education and  health  services have given decreasing 
returns.  The real problem  is the  quality of the  services 
provided;  and  no  solution can be  found without considering 11. 
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the  question of  the  administering agency. 
Bureaucratic inefficiency. 
The  agency responsible  for dealing with constantly 
rising collective needs which  cannot be properly 
satisfied through  the normal  market processes,  is,  of 
course,  the State. 
The  result has been  a  vast expansion of  the 
administrative machine  and  a  more  important role for 
the administering bureaucracy. 
The  bureaucratic  form  of organisation, which Weber 
recommended  as  ideal  for  rational action,  is now  more  or 
less discreditede  There  are  complaints  on all sides 
that bureaucracy is "inefficient"  in meeting  the  demand 
for public services.  Administrative reforms  are 
demanded  to speed up,  decentralise,  a.nd  "streamline" 
procedures,  and  so on. 
But  the  problem of bureaucratic administration 
seems to  go deeper;  in  addition  to  the  charge  of 
inef~iciency, critical consideration must be given to 
the bureaucracy's ability to meet  the  needs of a  modern 
industrial society and to its position in the pattern 
of power. 
Government  services are still reasonably efficient 
in their own  traditional  sphere  of administration.  It 
is precisely this type  of administrative activity which 
does not fit in with the  needs  of a  modern,  go-ahead 
and varied industrial  society. 
By  administrative action I  mean  action taken within -19-
limits from  which all doubt  is excluded by  the 
strict application of  rules  and  the rigid demarcation 
of duties in discharge af an objectively-determined 
function and  in conditions not  subject to  sudden  change. 
The  hall-marks of  a  modern  industrial society are 
constantly-changing conditions and an atmosphere  of 
uncertainty. 
This is true of "private"  needs which are  expressed 
through the market;  it  is also increasingly true of 
collective economic  and  social needs.  These  needs 
cannot be fixed  as  norm~  but must be treated as 
magnitudes  which vary with  the  community's requirements. 
Because  of its authoritarian and hierarchical 
nature,  the administrative machine  crystallises its 
objectives  into rules of  conduct, which it follows 
and applies uniformly,  regardless of the way  the public 
reacts.  The  civll service has functions,  not objectives, 
rules rather  than alternatives and rigid procedures 
rather  than  options. 
Administration on  the Weberian pattern is perfectly 
rational in a  relatively static and  ''certai~'  situation 
but becomes  irrational in uncertain and  rapidly-changing 
circumstances,  whe~ the  problem is to identify objectives 
after first studying what is needed  and feasible,  to 
provide  the  necessar.y  means  and to  modify both objectives 
and  means  continuously according to the reactions aroused. 
It is not,  therefore,  a  matter of restraining the 
excesses  and  curbing  the  unhealthy features of bureaucracy 
but of  questioning the bureaucratic organisation of  the 
social services as  such. -20-
The  bureaucratic structure which  is strictly 
functional within its sphere (with clearly specified 
powers)  and formal  in its administration (with  standard, 
uniform  rules)  cannot,  without  disowning itself, be 
transformed  into machinery for dealing with objectives. 
Quite mclerstlu:rlribly  therefore, it resists any 
attempt not so much  at decentralisation which within 
limits,  is quite  compatible,  with a  functional pattern, 
but rather at planning,  in the  sense of action directed 
to the achievement of  specific objectives. 
There is  also the well-known  tendency of the 
bureaucracy to become  a  closed corporation,  to "eliminate 
the end-purpose"  of its action (1), which is to  serve 
the public and  to become  an end  in itself, thus widening 
further the gulf between the  administration and  the 
public ( 2);  it is thus  ceasing  to be  the "responsible 
and  responsive"  structure it has been said to be  (Robson)  (3) 
( 1)  C.M.M.  Joad  :  "Decadence  ;,  a  philosophical enquiry'', 
London,  1948. 
( 2)  R.K.  Merton  :  ttThe  unanticipated  consequences  of 
purposive social action". 
Am.  Soc. Rev.  1936  PP•  894/904  and 
"Bureaucratic structure  and personality," 
Social Forces XVIII  (1940; 
( 3)  A.  Gouldner  :  "Patterns of Industrial Bureaucracy", 
Glencoe,  1954. -21-
12.  In modern  society,  therefore,  bureaucracy is not 
irrational because it is inefficient but because  of 
what it actually is. 
In the case  of public services,  the problem is 
not  so much  the amount  of money  the State can provide 
for  the purpose but the illogical way  that money  is 
administered;  there is no  link with the political demand 
which  can only be determined by completely rational, 
democratic planning, but administrative rules which 
have  become  wholly arbitrary with the  pass~ge of ttme 
are  applied. 
These rules are of course regularly adjusted by 
what has been called "parallel bureaucratic administration" 
by which  is meant,  using the  considerable discretionary 
powers available  to  the  civil service to meet the 
demands  of economic pressure groups  and political 
clients (Giovanni Gioli tti said  that rules. are interpreted 
for friends and  applied  to  enemies). 
While  this may  be  a  nmalfunction"  fran  the Weber1an 
point of view,  it is still no  remedy for the illogical 
character of administrative action. 
The bureaucracy therefore has no  subjective 
responsibility and  there may  be  no  need  to reform it 
as  such.  Armoured  cavalr,y in close formation was 
a  wonderful invention.  At Aginco~t it fought bravely 
as  always.  The  blame for its defeat lay not witb 
itself but with the English archers,  against whom 
the  cavalry was  impotent.  We  must  ask ourselves, 
therefore, whether  the  ineffectiveness  of administrative 
action in the  specific case  of  the demand  for -22-
economic  and social collective  services does not 
stem from  the nature of  the State itself;  and 
whether  the State  should not get down  from  its horse 
and learn  to  live in a  different way. 
The  two  linked problems  which  emerge  are  the 
rationalisation of decisions  and  greater democracy in 
administration. 
Rationalisation of decisions 
Things which are  completely reasonable  in  the 
earthly paradise of bureaucracy become  unreasonable 
in our  restless purgatory.  It is now  universally 
recognised  that resources for collective needs  are 
irrationally administered.  The  vast  sums  entrusted 
to  the State are  applied according  to established 
patterns  and  the  relative strengths of  the various 
branches  of the administration,  in dealing with each 
other and with other pressure groups.  They are 
allocated in accordance with ancient rules which  are 
both inflexible and  arbitrary. 
The  traditional  method  of drawing  up  the State 
budget is common  knowledge.  It involves  a  process of 
decision which  one  student  of public finances  has  called 
"muddling  through"  (1).  The  spending authorities  come 
to  the political market  and  strike  a  bargain;  as  in 
every oligopolistic market,  there  is no point in trying 
to  change  everybody's  share by starting a  fight if the 
relative  strengths engaged  are not substantially changed. 
a 
The  result is/kind of order which is highly instructive 
to  observe without  enquiring into its basis  in logic. -23-
This  method has been extrapolated from  the State 
budget to the national  economic  budget when  various 
neede have  driven  some  governments  to adopt national 
economic planning. 
National economic planning springs from  the need  to 
maintain a  short-term balance between supply and demand 
or to ensure faster general  economic development 
or more  balanced development between regions  and  sectors. 
As  the more  general economic  objectives and the planners' 
"aggregates''  are broken down  into more  specitic objectives, 
they reveal  the  inadequacy of· the available instruments 
for analysis and  the  strong dislike of the administrative 
machine for  any attempt to define objectives. 
(1)  C.L.  Schultz, "The politics and  economics  of public 
spending" ,  Washington 1968. 
There  is thus a  danger of  economic  planning becoming 
th&  victim of a  conspiracy between the civil service and 
the keepers of the _nation's accounts. 
The nation's accounts  in fact fit perfectly into 
the favourite  image  of a  cake  to be divided;  a  bit for 
you  and  a bit for you,  but be  careful not  to take 
more  than there is (1).  The basic problem is presented 
as  one  of dividing  a  finite  guanti~ wisely between a 
number  of  uses.  In other words,  as a  typical  traditional 
"budget''  problem. 
This  leads  to  a  number  of mysterious rules.  For 
example,  the rule that defence  takes  ~  of  the national -24-
income.  Why  6}b  This  seems  to have been laid down 
in some  international agreement.  Then  1.1%  for 
aid to developing countries,  for the  same  reason. 
!]%  for health services;  "that's what  they do  in other 
countries"  and  so  on.  Within these  compartments, 
however,  the  usual methods  of oligopolistic bargaining 
between ministries, departments and  offices apply. 
As  a  result,  there  is  a  danger  that irrationality 
may  be planned and  approved by law. 
(1)  See Dow,  quoted by F.  Gaffe, Politica economica 
14.  Planning is at present passing  through  a  period 
of  criticism and  self-criticism.  The  realisation 
that decision-making processes are  open,  continuous 
and many-centred has  revealed  the  inadequacy  of  the 
theoretical pattern of national  accounting on which planning 
is based  and,  in particular, its inadequacy as an 
instrument for reaching  operational decisions (and not 
simply  a  table for checking the overall compatibility of 
decisions which are discounted  to  some  extent). 
At  the  same  time,  realisation of the  arbitrary 
nature of decisions  concerning the use  of Government 
funds  has  encouraged  efforts to find  new  methods  of 
"rational planningtt  based  on  the  application o:f  systems 
analysis. 
At  the moment,  the  old methods  of "planning expenditure" 
are  found  side by side with  the  new  methods,  which  are 
still in the experimental  stage;  and  this co-existence -25-
is likely to continue because of  the different 
approaches  ani  scope  of  the  two  techniques ( 1). 
However,  unless the  decision-making process is rationalised 
by the progressive  introduction of "objective planning" 
or "project planning''  methods,  expenditure  on collective 
(1)  Such  co-existence is made  possible by applying rational 
planning the microplanning of separate projects -
to the  instrumental  variables of the plan only (decisions) 
and by  applying macroplanning  to aggregates in the 
general  compatibility table. 
needs is liable to  increase out  of all porportion, 
with  a  colossal amount  of waste (2)  without any  corresponding 
increase in human  well:-being;  on  the  contrary,  the present 
confusion and hardship will become  worse. 
"Unless we  are  to risk an uncontrolled explosion 
of  expenditure, it is inconceivable  that activities such 
as education,  which  sometimes  absorb  over one  twentieth 
of the nation's resources should be administered by a 
system and rules which  in some  cases are  over  one  hundred 
years old.  Again,  unless  we  accept the possibility 
of  sacrificing arbitrarily some  of the hopes  and essential 
needs  of modern  communities, it is illusory to try to 
arrest the progress of social departments by imposing 
ceilings arrived at by intuition ( 1)  " 
Project planning involves a  systematic  and  continuous 
study of  the  condition,  needs  and  aspirations of society, 
in order to define  the  aims -26-
(1)  As  already noted,  social expenditure rises faster 
than  total  income. 
highly elastic. 
Some  types  of expenditure  are 
(2)  J.M.  Collette, Etude  sur les systemes  de  d~cision", 
Institut de  recherche des Nations Unies  pour le 
developpement  social, Geneva  1970 
of social action within an overall plan;  it involves 
identifying and  costing the  various alternatives 
and  then deciding between them. 
This does not  assume  the existence of a  set 
scale of  social priorities or or  objectively-determined 
needs which must be  met;  it means  working  out a  scale of 
priorities and  a  social  plan,  on the basis of 
systematic research  and  exploration.  It is a  rational 
method  of  seeking  the  views  of  the public (reducing,  as 
far as possible,  the weight of emotive factors  or of 
downright inertia).  It is  a  method  of  arousing 
social demand,  by analysing  the  confused aspirations 
which at present find no backing or expression either 
in the political system  or  in the bureaucratic machine. 
Galbraith's "social balance"  can  only be restored 
by a  rationally-expressed social demand,  which  will 
give precise direction and first priority to  resources 
for  the  satisfaction of collective needs. 
~  democracy  in decision-making -27-
15.  Project-planning is therefore much  more  than 
a  technical problem.  The  choice of a  system of aocial 
indicators  and  the  introduction of systems analysis 
techniques do not mean  simply the replacement of the 
old bureaucratic machine by teams  of experts and 
technicians;  more democracy must be  injected into the 
decision-making process. 
Failure to  understand that the problem of 
rationalising decisions concerning public expenditure 
is essentially political, is perhaps the main cause 
of the  slow progress which the  new  techniques are 
making,  after the first flush of enthusiasm,  in the 
very countries which were  the first to  adopt  them. 
The  identification of social policy targets 
involves recruiting  the services of experts and 
technicians,  but the problem  cannot  be  solved by 
experts and  technicians  on behalf of society.  In his 
book "Lo  choc del futuro"  (The  impact of the future), 
Alvin Toffler recapitulates the  numerous  attempts 
made  in Americe  to define in systematic terms the  problem 
of setting social targets and  taking reasoned 
decisions :  they  include  the  study "Aims for 
Americans"  commissioned by President Eisenhower in 196o, 
the great PPBS  experiment  launched by Johnson and, 
lastly, Nixon's very recent solemn declarations:  "The 
time  has  come  for us  to dedicate  ourselves,  consciously 
and  systematically,  to  the problem of what kind of nation 
we  want  to be  ••••  I  have  to-day ordered,  here in the 
White House,  the  setting up  o:r  a  group  to study national aims ••  " -28-
"The problem is always "Who  is  to  determine  these 
aims'?  ( 1).  From whom  does  he  derive his  authority? 
How  is he  to  win  the  consent or the people  who  will have 
to  put those  aims  into effect? 
The  idea that  the  choice  should be entrusted to 
u qualif'iedu  experts  stems from  the belief' that the 
problems of modern  society have  become  too  complicated 
to be  dealt with by democratic methods.  In reality, this 
belief is  as  old  as  the hills.  Society has  always 
been  too  immature  and  its government's  problems  have 
always  been  too  complicated for those  who  start from  the 
belief that ordinary men  and  women  have  neither the 
capacity nor  the right  to  decide  their own  destiny. 
These  long-held elitist ideas,  which  have  been 
refurbished with  a  coat of technocratic paint,  are  in 
reality becoming  more  and  more  out of date  in our 
changir..g  industr"iial  society.  In this kir1d  of  society, 
with its cou:plexity,  variety and  constantly-changing 
structure,  there  is a  ver·y  high degree  o:f  social 
interaction,  calling for  a  :flow  o~ information  to  all 
points of the  compass.  Every "directivett  is an 
outgoing item of  inrormation which requires  a  reply, 
and  so  on.  The  claim that this flow  should be  channelled 
in the  single  traditional direction "from the top  downwards" 
(1)  A.  To:f:fler,  op.  cit pp.  468-469 -29-
blocks any feedback  and gives  the elite a  distorted 
image  of a  society moving in directions unknown  to it. 
The  technocratic elite thus finds· itself having  to  cope 
with  a  society which is incomprehensible,  improbable  and 
unforeseeable.  Even with all their sociologists and  their 
costly sophisticated forecasting instruments,  they are still 
bewildered by the  surprises which a  silent society conceals 
in the depths of its being. 
The  complexity of modern industrial society is 
certainly not I'eflected in the institutions of parliamentary 
democracy which  have  come  dovn  to us  almost unchanged from 
the  19th centur,y.  But  the whole problem is to change  these 
political institutions.  For a  society which is more  affluent, 
better educated and  potentially freer than its predecessors, 
the  change must be  in the direction of wider and  more  radical 
democracy. 
The  existing institution·s of democracy are criticized 
for  the  sake of  a  more  modern  and articulate democracy,  which 
must plan rather than be planned,  and not for the  sake of 
authoritarian solutions,  inspired by the barracks or  the 
factory,  which reveal,  even more  than their conservatism, 
the sterile imaginations of the everlasting inventors of 
"pol1ce-wh1stlett  republics. 
16.  Modern  society is making  ever-increasing demands  for 
planning and  self-government.  "In a  super-industrialised 
society, democracy is not a  political luxury but an absolute 
necessity''  ( 1) -30-
It is  of  course  utopian to dream  of  attaining a 
perfectly rational  and  democratic model  society.  But it 
is not in the least utopian  to try and find  solutions 
as  close to that model  as possible. 
Self-government  can be  pursued  as  an  ideal  through 
a  practical search for more  and  more  advanced  forms  of 
participation.  The  aim  is in no  way  to achieve 
the  impossible pattern of  a  completely anarchic society, 
but  to  answer  the demand  for participation whenever 
circumstances  so permit. 
Not all branches  of  society are  equally amenable 
to the "socialisation of power".  Businesses  are  among 
the least amenable because  of  their rigid  technological 
determinism.  The  same  applies  to  the main  security 
services- the police,defence forces  and  to  a  lesser 
extent  justice - for which the  administrative machine 
is essential  because  they  are 
(1)  A.  Toffler,  op.  cit,  page  471 
indivisible,  and  strictly objective,  and  have powers 
of  compulsion. 
On  the  other hand,  there  are  intermediate areas, 
where  the  degree  of freedom  of  expression,  variety and 
independence  enjoyed by society at large is less than it 
might be. 
In the  ever-widening field or  collective needs 
- welfare,  education,  health,  culture  and  leisure - there 
is vast  scope for varied forms  of participation in control. -31-
In these  cases,  administration can be rationalised 
and  objectives planned only through greater  democr~cy, 
with less state control and less bureaucracy. 
The  individual  social services are not divisible 
but they can be made  available  in optimum  "amounts" 
to social groups,  whose  size  should be determined by 
reference  to "satisfactory''  standards of efficiency 
and participation.  In other words,  manageable, 
planned  systems must be  created.  The  existing main 
headings under which  coll.ective  services like education, 
health,  etc.  are  classified,  have  become  unmanageable 
for any decision-making process based  on  planned 
objectives and for  the  attainment of the degree  of 
participation needed  to ensure  that the  service 
provided is efficient. 
Intermediate groupings  (communities)  must be 
established between  the State and the citizen to 
expand  the  demand  for social  services  and  take  over 
their administration. 
17.  On  a  territorial basis,  an  obvious  intermediate 
level is  the region or city.  The  present trend  towards 
the reconstitution of regional political authorities in 
Europe  clearly demonstrates the  intractability of the 
problem of territorial structures,  the  invironment and 
urban growth in these  days  of centralisation and  political 
apathy among  the  communities dir•ectly· concerned with  the 
use  of the territory. 18. 
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But modern means  of communication are  so  swift, 
and in some  cases  immediate,  that  communities  not  linked 
with territorial divisions  can be formed  by voluntary 
association,  on the basis of plans  aimed  at common 
objectives;  these might be  called "planning  communi ties" 
Going further,  ~lans can be  limited to  a  single aspect 
of social  life-permanent educational centres,  health 
'  schemes,  tourist routes,  and  so  on - or  to a  number  of 
related aspects,  leading finally to  complex,  well-articulated 
communities;  these  would  be  "planning universities"  and 
new  "cities "  (polis)  round which  the fabric of social 
relations,  now  threatened with disruption,  could be  reformed. 
In contrast with "technostructures"  characterised by 
the mobilisation of mankind  in the  service  of production, 
they might be  called '' polistructure  s" • 
The  decentralisation of social  services to 
such communities  would  naturally require  new  institutions 
capable  of maintaining a  fair balance between the central 
government,  the  community  and  the  citizen. 
Relations between central  governments  and  communities 
would  have  to be  in some  contractual form  (possibly similar 
to a  concession)  defining the  communities'  sphere  of 
independence  and retaining overall planning and  supervisory 
powers for the central government.  Agreements  of this 
kind  would  have  to be  sufficiently flexible to adapt  to 
changing circumstances.  The  central governments would 
thus become  planning and  control centres for public economic -33-
and  social  services.  Rather than by rigid rules their 
relations with  the  communities would  be  governed more 
by the "variable constitution"  of  the National Plan, 
which would  embody  and  consolidate all the  plans worked 
out at the different levels. 
The  communities would,  naturally,  enjoy a  considerable 
measure  of autonomy  in the  matter of finance.  The 
principle of  a  single budget,  like that o'f  a  uniform 
structure,  is no  longer compatible with the  conditions of 
modern society.  It should be retained for the indivisible 
sectors of the public services - such as  the  security 
services - which need  a  uniform,  centralised administration. 
The  economic  and  social  serv~ces could be financed partly 
from  the central plan,  through an equalisation fund,  to 
ensure  a  minimum  service for every citizen,  and partly 
by direct contributions from  the members  of the particular 
community. 
19.  Each  community would  also enjoy wide  autonomy as 
regards its own  internal organisation and  would  set up 
institutions which  would  have  to be  recognised by the 
central government.  The  "incorporation"  of the  community 
would  guarantee its members'  rights and a  democratic form 
of organisation. 
The  participation of members  in the government  of 
the  community would  be  ensured by the direct link 
established between the  services provided  and  the  source 
of the necessary funds;  it would  be given concrete 
expression through  the  community's representative bodies. -34-
Within  such representative bodies the principle 
of "no  taxation without representation"  would  regain 
its original, historical meaning. 
Furthermore,  in a  community  responsible for putting 
a  plan into effect,  the relationship between governors 
and  governed  would  no  longer be  one  of uncontested 
authori~ but one  of two-sided discussion,  with the 
administrators acting increasingly as experts in the 
service of the  community,  vested with powers  closely 
linked with their duties  under  the plan. 
The  most forceful  example  is in the teacher-pupil 
relationship.  It is quite ridiculous to call for its 
replacement by an  impossible self-taught community,  as 
demanded by  the wildest and  noisiest of protesters. 
It is equally  anachronistic  that schools  should  continue 
to be  a  kind  of  cultural barracks where well-drilled 
regiments  of disciplined pupils are  taught uniform  ideas, 
mental habits  and  forms  of behaviour.  A proper balance 
can be  achieved in a  community  of  teachers  and  pupils, 
on  the basis of critical coliaboration,  this relationship 
accepts  the master's authority based  on lmowledge  and 
uses it to  the benefit of his critical students;  on 
this basis,  many  decisions  concerning  the  life of  the 
community  are  taken  jointly. 
In these  circumstances,  the  "government"  of  the 
community becomes  the  opposite  of a  bureaucratic 
administration;  it is a  light and  flexible  structure 
which  is modified  continuously by  the  community "plan"; 20. 
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it is linked with  the  aims  o~ the plan  ar~ sanctioned by 
the  consent of  the  members  of  the  coniDunity. 
The  principle of free  association \·.:i th  the  community 
naturally means  that its members  can  join and  withdraw 
at vtill.  This also opens  the way  to competition and 
emulation in seeking effective and  efricient methods  of 
management;  where  the  administration has  a  complete 
monopoly  there  can be  no  such  competitio~. 
It may  well be argued  that machinery of this lcind 
would  require  a  different breed of men  from  those  whom 
nature has evolved by a  lengthy process  of  selection._ 
Here  again,  however,  the pessimism  of  conventional 
Wi$dam  should be put  to  the  test.  Only rural  communities 
living in the past can  allow  themselves  the  luxury of 
living by proverbs.  Industrial  communities  are 
constantly having to  solve new  problems. 
One  such problem is that at a  certain stage in 
the  satisfaction of individual needs,  the selfish acquisitive 
instinct ceases to be  a  powerful incentive to action. 
It is supplemented  and  replaced by other equally selfish, 
but more  sophisticated motives.  Among  these, pride  in 
good work,  professional esteem,  pleasure in having one's 
ideas  shared and determination to  carry through a  joint 
enterprise are all gaining in strength and  importance. 
Mandeville's provocative  juxtaposition of private vice 
and public virtue, which  so  scandalised the detractors 
of  the "dismal  science",  is now  losing its significance. 21. 
-36-
It would  seem  rather that  the new,  younger 
generations of  society are  sho'I;Jing  certain heal  thy 
disaffection for all forms  o~ encouragement  to individual 
competition;  such rivalry no  longer finds its expression 
in the harsh  and  bracing climate  o:f  industrial production, 
in the  good  old days  o:f  the Victorian entrepreneur, but 
in the harassing and  invigorating  atmosphere  of  consumer 
"  competition when  the motto is "to keep  up  with the Jones • 
Willingness  to take part in  joint,  creative activities 
and  to work  towards  a  co~non goal is not  just a  philosophical 
hypothesis.  It is a  need which  is already finding 
expression,  as yet in distorted and  largely unconscious 
:forms  (1), but still in :forms  which  are  clear to  everyone 
but lovers  o:f  old proverbs. 
The European Economic Community:  opportunities  and  dangers 
A  few  words  in conculsion. 
The  last twenty years have  sho\vn  us  that  economic 
growth  does  not automatically lead  to greater happiness. 
Social needs  and  aspirations which  cannot easily be 
financially quantified must  be  satisfied,  in order to 
ensurle  than economic progress does  not ultimately lead 
to  social ills.  But  these  needs  and  aspirations call 
for more  than  the  mobilisation of increased resources. 
They 
(1)  See E.  Ii'ronilil,  uPsicanalisi delia vita moderna,  Community. 22. 
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also call for  a  plan of action which will give  a  definite 
direction and precise meaning to social measures. 
Furthermore,  neither "objective11  nor  11project11  plamcan be 
implemented by the old bureaucratic administrations or 
by  teams  of  tec~~ocrats.  Such planning must be based  on 
constant,  direct participation by the general public.  This 
will  involve  the redistribution and "socialisationu  of 
power,  the progressive dismantling of the bureaucratic 
structure  and  the direct transfer to  communities  of citizens, 
formed  for particular projects,  of responsibility for 
determining  the  "demand"  for  social  services  and for their 
management. 
Potentially at least,  the  creation of  the  European 
Economic Community  offers  a  great opportunity for 
reducing the role of  the State  and  for directing  the 
economic development  of  the members  of the Community 
towards  a  genuine  improvement  in the  n·guali  ty of'  life" • 
In other words,  the EEC  could be  a  European "Grand 
Design"  to which  its structures  should be  geared. 
Unfortunately, it must be  admitted  that  things have 
tur·ned out di:Cfei
1ently so far. 
The kind  of development  towal~d.s  which  the  E:SC  seems 
to be directed has  an economic  z;a.IGher  than  a  community 
bias.  Much  more  than  the  quality of life,  economic  and 
technological  development would  so  :f'a1•  appear to  have 
been its drivir€ force. 
From  the political angle,  the Community's  institutions 
seem  to  be moving  towards  the  pattern of a  super state, 
seeking for itself powers at present exercised by the -38-
ns.tional States. 
These  trends  have  :~ccontuated the  tlvo  negative 
i'Go.tur-as  vvhich  have  gone  l:nnd  in hand with the  otherwise 
enormous  exvansion  o:f  '8urope' s  economy  over·  the last 
t\~1 0  decrlc1cs;  these  are,  :fir::1t,  technological  and. 
:Qroducti  ve  r;rowtl:  without  any  Docial purpose  to  pl~ovide 
the  n8ceGsDry  justi:Clcation, direction and  standard.  of 
ap:prr1  i~~al;  o..nd  secondly,  a  gx•eater measure  of bureaucracy 
in  those  fiel<.lr-.-;  of·  hurnan  activity 
cducati  on  nnd  cul  tu1-aal  activities 
the  social services, 
which  should constitute 
the  f:r·~est  and  most  dir0ct  e:x:pression  of  a  society rich 
The  worst possible  rc-:- sul  t  of  this proeess  ~-.roulc1 
1J,3  tLe  combination or Japanese-style  technocratic laissez-
faire with  a  Russiun-otyle bureaucracy. 
born  of  the 1mion of  these  two  ~artners would  decidely 
be  a  ~onstrosity. 
The  ~urope of  to-morrow  can te  a  strong  and  re~ota 
~~ccumula  ticn of.,  o.bstrs.ct  £iO\:,;er  to do  goodness l:nov:s 
cxactl;)T ';;hat;  or it can  ::.~0  a  "G-rc..::d.  Desi;;nn  capable  of' 
brincing  to.s;c;tl:.e:c  ar:rd  unifyi:r:;: national  and  regional 
conununities,  \.ihich nill l;:ee;f'  7-hsir  individuality and 
&dministrativo mcchi2ery;  ~hie~ ~ill put politics before 
~conomics 2Dd  culture bGfore  rolitico. A  P  F·  :E  J:\  L  I  X 
Data relating  to  social expenditure  in certain countries 
of  the Western World  during  the  period 1959/69. 
Notes  : 
a)  Absolute  figures  are  expressed  in  the  currency  of  the 
country 
b)  Social  investments  are  obtained by  addiLg  together 
public  and housing  investment 
c)  Public  consumption  is shown  for  the  Forces  and  for 
Civilians.  The  information is available  only  in this 
form  for  purposeH  of  international comparisons 
d)  Social  costB  are  obtained  by  adding  social  investwentB 
to  public  consumption 
e)  Social  expenditure  is obtained by  adding  together· 
social costs  and  current  transfers  from  the Public 
Administration consolidated account 
f)  Changes  between  the  various  items  of social expenditure 
and  national  income  are  calculated for  the  periods 
concerned  by  rekting  the  rate  of variation of the 
items  to  the  rate  of variations  of national  income  at 
market  prices 
g)  All  information  is giveL at current prices 
h)  Countries are  lisLed  iL  decreasiLg  order  of  import&nce 
of  the  national  income  portion  earmCA.rked  for  oo cial 
expenditure  for 1969. Table  1  - DEVELOPMENT  IN  THE  b"HARE  OF  NATIONAL  INCOME  EARMARKED 
FOR  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  DURING  THE  PERIOD  1959/69  IN 
CERTAIN  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  WESTERN  WORLD 
1959  1964  1969  :  1959  1964  1969  :  1959  1964  1969 
Countries  :  Social  investmen"B·  Social costs  Social exEenditure 
National  income  Nationai  income  E'al;ionai _income 
I  : 
l  I 
Netherlands  7,8  8,5  9,4  21,3  24,1  25,1  31,5  36,8  42,6 
:  I 
:  Sweden  5,9  6,8  7,0  :  23,4  25,1  29 ,o (l):  31,4  34,4  41,1 
I  •  • 
Frmce  •  7,6  9,6  10,2  I  2l,O  22,4  22,5  34,0  )b,O  39,3  • 
•  •  . German  F.R •  s,:;(~l1,o  9,0  21 ,9(~5  '7  24,5  34 ,3 (2)'58 ,2  37,7  • 
Italy  7,6  9,0  8,9  19,7  22,5  22,4  30,6  34,0  37,6 
Belgium  6,5  9,3  8,4  19,2  22,1  22,6  30,4  33,C  36,3  .  .  .  . 
: 
.  • 
a 
: 
.  • 
Norway  •  4,4  4,1  4,9(J)a  18,6  19,6  23,1(1):  27,0  28,6  3'5 ,o (  l):  • 
USA  :  8,3 
:  UK  3,5  .  •  Denmark  3,5 
:  Japan  9,0 
(1)  ]'igures for  1968 
(2)  Figures for 1960 
7,4 
4,8 
' 4,4 
10,7 
6,3  26,3  25,9 
5,6  20,3  21,8  .  . 
4 ,a:l):  16,3  19,2  .  . 
lC ,OCl):  18,3  19,5 
Source  :  National Accounts  of OECD  countries 
27,3  31,3  31,1  33,6  .  .  .  . 
23,7  26,8  28,6  32,4  .  . 
19,8  2'3 '7  26,8  29 ,,3"(J):  .  . 
18,2  22,3  23,5  21,9(J): Table  2  - RATIO  OF  EXPENDITURE  EARMARKED  FOR  SOCIAL  PURPOSES 
RELATED  TO  NATIONAL  INCOME  DURING  THE  PERIOD 
1959/69  IN  CERTAIN  COUNTRIES  OF  THE  WESTERN  WORLD 
:  ·~59/64 ]964/69  1959/69  :1959/641964/69 1959/€9~59/64  1964/691959/69  ~ 
:  Countries  a  Social  investments  Social  costs  Social  expenditure: 
.  . 
N  ationa1  income  National  income  National  income 
1---------- ------·--------------- -------------------:-·------------------
1  I 
:Netherlands:  1,2  1,2 
1,1 
1,1 
0,4 
1,0 
0,7 
1,5 
0,6 
1,5 
0,9 
0,9 
1,2 
1,2 
1,3 
1,1 
1,2 
1,4 
1,2 
0 ,6 
1,8 
1,2 
1,1 
1,3  1,1 
1,5 
1,0 
0,9 
1,0 
1,1 
1,4 
1,1 
1,2  1,3 
: 
:Sweden  (1)  :  1,3 
: 
:France  :  1,5 
I  : 
aGerman  R.f.t  1,9 
:  {2 j 
:Italy  1,3 
I 
aBelgium 
I 
:norway 
I 
1USA 
: 
:UK 
: 
:Denmark 
I 
:Japan 
I  2 ,0 
I 
0,9 
0,6 
2,1 
1,5 
1,2 
1,2 
1,1 
1,5 
1,3 
1,4 
1,1 
0,9 
1,2 
1,4 
1,1 
1,3 
1,1 
0,9 
1,3 
1,1 
1,2 
1,1 
1,2 
1,3 
1,1 
1,2 
1,2 
1,0 
(lJ Results  of the  periods 1959/64,  1964:68,  1959/68 
(2) Results  of  the  periods 1960/64,  1964,69,  1960/69 
Source  1  National Accounts  of CECD  countries 
1,2 
1,2 
l  ,3 
1,2 
1,2 
1,2 
1,0 
1,2 
1,3 
1,1 
1,3 
1,6 
1,1 
1,0 
1,3 
1,3 
1,5 
1,2 
1,4 
1,2 
0,9 
1,3 
1,4 
1,2 
1,2 
l  ,2 
1,2 
1,3 
1,1 
1,3 
1,2 
1,0 Table 3.1 - DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  FROM  1959 
TO  1969  IN  THE  NETHERLANDS 
:  . 
' . 
:  Million ~lorins 
at current Prices: 
1959  1964  1969  .  •  .  .. 
:  .  . 
1140  2330  4060  .  •  :  Public  investments 
•  . 
:Housing  .  . 
:Social  inves~~1!  .  . 
:Public  consumption 
.  . 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
:Social costs  .  . 
:Transfers  .  . 
:Social expenditure 
: 
:Gross national 
:expenditure at 
:market prices 
.  :  . 
:  1820  2897  5510  : 
:  .  •  :  2960  5227  9570  :  .  :  .  . 5086  9560  ~Q.6020  :  •  .  :  . 
:  (1397j (2573)  (3300)  .  .  .  . 
;  (3689: 
• 
(6981)  (12720)  .  •  .  .  .  . 
:  8046  J4. 787  2.5590  :  .  :  .  . 3889  7863  :17820  :  . 
:  .  . 
:1193522650  43410  •  . 
:  : 
:37829 61463  101.880 
I 
I  . 
Average  annual 
.tax 
59-64  64-69 
15.,4  11,8 
9,8  13 '7 
12,0  12,9 
13,4  10,9 
( 1~ ,o)  (5 ,1) 
( 13 ,6)  ( 12 ,8) 
1219  1126 
15,1  17,4 
1317  1319 
1022  10,6 
59-69 
13,6 
11,7 
12,5 .  . 
12,2: 
•  . 
( 9 ,0): 
: 
( 13  .~: 
: 
12,3: 
: 
16,5:  .  • 
13.8:  .  • 
J:Q.l!: 
..  . 
Ratio related 
to  incomf  : 
59-64  64-69  5%9: 
0 . 
:  .  • 
1,5  1,1  1,3  : 
•  . 
1,0  1,3  1,1 .  . 
: 
J:..,.g_  hl 1,2  : 
: 
1,3  1,0  1,2 .  • 
: 
( 1,3) (  .~ ' 5)  ( 0 ' 9 ) : 
I  : 
( 1,3) ( 1 '2) ( 1 , 3 ) : 
: 
___L2_  _±.d_ ~~ 
: 
1,5  1,6  1,6  : 
: 
_hl  .l:..t2._ l:.!L. :  . 
I 
:  . 
Percentage  in respect of national  income  at market 
prices 
-----------------~------~----~------------------------------
: 
:Public  .  . 
:Housing  .  • 
:Social 
investments:  3,01 
: 
4,81 
•  • 
investment  ..  s:  7,82 
.  . 
3,79  3,99:  . 
4,71  5 ,4li  .  . 
~  9 140: 
:  :  : 
:Public  consumption:  13,44  ~5,56 15,72: 
:  : 
:  (Military)  :  (3 ,69) (4 ,19  (3 ,24):  . 
(C i vili~::tn)  ( 9,  75  )~1  ,37)(12 ,48);  .  . 
~.social costs  .  . 
:Transfers 
:  : 
21,26  ~1,06'25,12:  .  . 
:  10,28  12,79 17,49: 
:  I  : 
:Social expenditure:  31,54  36,85  42,61: 
Source  :  National Accounts  of OECD  Cour1tries Table  3.2  -DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  FROM  1959  TO  1969 
IN  5'WEDEN 
Million krones  Average  annual  Ratio related 
at current prices  tax  to  income 
1959  1964  1968  59-64  64-68  59-68  59-64  61-68 
Public  investrrients  287  669  1091  15,5  13,0  16,0  1,99  1,57 
Housing  3389  5893  8188  11,7  8,6  10,3  1,26  1,04 
Social  investments  3676  6562  9279  12,3  9,1  10,8 1,32  1,10 
Public  consumption  10827  17572  29002  10,1  13,4  11,5  1,09  1,61 
(Military)  (.2822)  (4064)  ( 5215)  (7 ,6)  ( 6 ,4)  (7 ,1) (0 ,82)  (0 '71)' 
(Civilian)  ( 8005) (J3508)  ( 23767)  (11 ,o)  (15 ,2)  (  12 ,E?) (1 '18)  (1 ,83) 
Social costs  14503  2'.4134  36281  10,7  12,2  11,4  1,15  1,47 
' Transfers  4953  9038  16109  12,8  15,6  14,0  1,38  1,88 
Social  exEenditure  19456 3 3172  54390  11,3  13,1  12,1 1,22  1,58 
Gross  national  61879  96328  132195  9,3  8,3  8  8  - -
expenditure  at  =  ~ 
market  prices 
Percentage  iL  respect  of national  income  at market 
prices 
Public  investffients 
Housing 
Social  investments 
0,46  0,69 
5,48  6,12 
0,83 
6,19 
Public  consumption  17,50  18,24 ·  21,94 
(Military)  (4 ,56:  (4 ,22)  (3 ,95) 
(Civilian)  ( 12,  94)(14 ,02)  (17,  99) 
Social costs 
Transfers 
Social  expenditure 
23,44  25,05  28,96 
8,00  9,38  12,19 
31,44  34,44  41,14 
Source  :  National Accounts  of OECD  Countries 
59-158 
1,82 
1,17 
1,2) 
1,31 
(0 ,8~ 
(1 ,45: 
1,30 
1,59 
1,38 
-»EVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE 
Table  3.3  FROM  1959  TO  1969  IN  FRANCE 
Mil)}ion  francs  Average  annual  Ratio related 
at current p»ices  tax  to income 
Public invest-
mente 
Housing 
Social invest-
menta 
Public  con  sump-
tion 
(:Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
·Transfers 
Social ex;2en-
Inure 
Gross national 
expendiiture  at 
market prices 
Public invest-
ments 
Housing 
Social invest-
ments 
Public  consump-
1959 
6,05 
14,55 
20 160 
36,71 
(15,97) 
(20,74) 
57 1Jl 
.15,35 
22 166 
2r2,56 
2,22 
5,34 
~ion  13,47 
(Military)  (5,86) 
(Civilian)  (7,61) 
Social costs  21 103 
Transfers  12,97 
Social expen-
diture  _14,00 
1964  1969  59-64  64-59  59-69  59-64 
14,33  23,60  18,8  10,5  14,6  1,74 
29,.31  50,36  15,0  11,4  13,2  1,39 
4J164  7Ja26  16 12  11,1  !hl  1 150 
58,33  89,12  9,7  8,8  9,3  0,89 
(19,14) (25,4.-J) (.3,7)  {5,9)  (4,8)  (0,34) 
(39,19) (63,69) (13, 6)  (10,2)  (11,9)  (11,26) 
101127  0..63.08  12 12  .2.!.2  1110  1111J 
71,49 0..21,74  15,1  .11,2  13,2  11,40 
17J,16  284,~2  ~  10,4  .!.!ti  1,24 
455,99  725,00  10,8  !hl.  !2J.l  -
Percentage  in respect of national income 
at market  pri.ces 
3~14  3,25 
6,43  6,95 
~  10,20 
12,79  12,29 
( 4'  20)  ( 3' 51 ) 
(8,59)  (8,78) 
22 136  22,19 
15,68  16,79 
)8,04  39,28 
Source  National Accounts  of OECD  Countries 
64-69 
1,08 
1,18 
1114 
0,91 
(0,61) 
(1,05) 
1,02 
1,15 
1,07 
-· 
59-69 
1,42 
1,28 
.L..Jg_ 
o,go 
(0,47) 
(1,16) 
1,07 
1,28 
1,16 
-Table  3.4  - DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  FROM  1959  TO  1969 
IN  THE  GERMAN  F.R. 
Million D.  Marks  Average  annual  Ratio related  at current prices  tax  to  income 
1960  1964  1969  60-64  64-69  60-69  60-64  64-69 
Public  investments  7,96  19,51  23 ,21  25,1  3,5  2 ,6  2,9  0,5 
Housing  17,09  26,81  30,77  12,0  2,8  6,8  1,4  0,4 
Social  investments 25105  46135  53198  16,7  2.d.  ~  ~  __Q_d_ 
Public  consumption  41,12  62,24  93 ,17  10,9  8,4  9,5  1,3  1,2 
(Military)  (9 ,64~ (15 ,81)  (19 ,05)  ( 13 ,3)  (3 ,8)  (7 ,9)  (1 ,5)  (0 ,5) 
(Civilian)  (31 ,48)(46 ,37)  (74 ,12)  ( 10 ,2)  (9  .~)  ~10 ,o)  (1 ,2)  ( 1 ,3) 
I 
Social costs  66117108,59  147,15  1312  .LL  ...2..tl.  .b.2_ ~ 
Transfers  37,61 52,86  79,64  8,9  8,5  8,7  1,0  1,2 
Social expenditure  103 '78 l61 ,45  226 179  ,1117  710  ~  1 13  _!_&_ 
Gross national  302 ,55 J22 ,14  001,40  ~  7,3  7,9 
expenditure at 
market prices 
Percentage  in respect of national  income  at market 
prices 
Public  investments  2,63  4,62  3,86 
Housing  5,65  6,36  5,12 
Social  investments  8 128  10,98  8 198 
Public  consumption 13,59 14,74  15,49 
(Military)  (3 ,19: (3,  76)  (3 ,17) 
(Civilian)  (10 ,40)~10 ,98)  (12 ,32) 
Social costs  21,87  25,72  24.47 
Transfers  12,43  12,52  13,24 
Social  ~~~enditure 34,30  38 124  37 171 
Source  :  National Accounts  of  OECD  Countries 
60-69 
1,6 
0,9 
1.1 
1,2 
(1 ,0) 
( 1 ,3) 
112 
1,1 
112 Table 3.5  - DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  FROM  1959  TO  1969 
IN  ITALY 
Public  investments 
Housing 
:Social  investments 
Public  consumption 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
Transfers 
Social  expenditure 
Gross national 
expenditure  at 
market  prices 
Public  investments 
Eousing 
~ocial investments 
Public  consumption 
(IV~ ili  tary) 
(Civilian) 
Soc ia1.:-; costs 
Transfers 
Social  expenditure 
Million Lire  Average  annual  Ratio related 
at current P.rices  taJC  tc  incone 
1959  1964  1969  59-64  64-69 159-69  59-64  64-69  59-69 
319  612  847  11,9  6,7  9,3  1,7  0,8  0,9 
1172  2453  3713  15,9  8,6  12,2  1,4  1,0  1,2 
1521  3065  4560  15,0  ...hl  11,6  ~  .hQ.  1,2  --
2416  4594  6876  13,7  8,4  11,0  1,2  1,0  1,1 
(502)  (811)  (1902)  (10 'JJ  (18 ,6)  (14 ,2)  (0,9  (2 ,2)  ( 1 ,4) 
(1914)  (3783)  ( 497  4)  (14 ,6)  (5 ,6)  ( 10 ,o)  ( 1 ,3)  (0 '7)  ( 1 ,o) 
3937  7659 11436  14,2  8,4  11,2  ..b2  l:..!2_  ..l:..t1.  --
2196  3.912  7777  12,3  14,7  13,6  1,1  1,7  1,4 
6133  11571  19213  13,5  10,7  12  1  .=!:..!..::  _hg_  b.2...  _1...£ 
20029_ ~402_7  51066  11,2  8,5  9,8  - - - --
Percentage  in respect of national· income  at market 
prices 
1,74  1,80  1,66 
5,85  7,21  7,27 
7,59  9,01  8,93 
12,06  13,50  13,46 
(2 ,50) (2 ,38)  (3,  72) 
(9,56,  ~11 ,12)  (9,74) 
19,65  22,51  22,39 
10,96  11,50  15,23 
30 161  34,01  37 162 
Source  :  National Accounts  of OECD  Countries Table  ).6 
Publia investments 
Housing 
Sovial investments 
Public  consumption 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
Transfers 
Social exEenditure 
iross national 
xpenditure at 
market  prices 
Public  investments 
Housing 
Social invest-
ments 
Public  consumption 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
Transfers 
Social ex12enditure 
DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE 
from 1959  TO  1969  IN  BELGIUM 
Million francs  I  Average  annual  Ratio related 
at current· prices  tax  to  income 
~.59  64  .  69- 59-64  64-69  59-69  59-64 
9,8  19,5  33,3  14,7  11,3  1),0  1,9 
24,5  52,2  61,8  16,3  3,4  9,7  2,1 
.lL..l  71,7  ~  15,9  .2.&  10,7  2,0 
67,5  .98,9 161,6  8,0  10,3  9,1  1,0 
(1 7'  6)  (23,6: (31,6)  (6 ,1)  (6,0)  (6,0)  (0,8) 
(49,9)  (15, 3' (130, 0:  (8,6)  (11,5) (10,1)  (1,1) 
10118  17016  256 17  1.Q.L2  _M  ~  1 14 
59,5  84,2  155,4  7,2  13,0  10,1  0,9 
16113  254 18  412 11  .9.12  10,1  ~  1 12 
531 11  773 24  1136,4  7,8  810  1z9  -
Percentage  in respect  of national  income 
at market  price 
1,85  2,52  2,93 
4,61  6,75  5,44 
6._,..!.£  ~h27  _§.t.J1 
12,71. 0-2,79  14,22 
(3,31) (3,05)  (2 t 78) 
(9,40) (9,74) (11,44) 
1~ 2 17 22,06  22 1 5~ 
11,20 10,89  1),67 
J01J7  132 t 95  J6 226 
64-69; 
1,4 
0,4 
0,7 
1,3 
(0,8) 
Cl,4) 
1 11 
1,6 
b1 
-
59-69 
1,6 
1,2 
1,4 
1,2 
(0,8) 
(1, 3) 
1 12 
1,3 
1,2 
-
Source  :  National Accounts  of  OECD  Countries Table  3.7 - DEVELO~NT IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  FROM  1959  TO  1969 
IN  NORWAY 
Public  investments 
Housing 
Social  investments 
Public  consumption 
(!l ili  ta.ry) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
Transfers 
- Social  ex~enditure 
Gross national 
expenditure  at 
market prices 
Public  investments 
Housing 
Social investments 
Public  consumption 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
Transfers 
Social expenditure 
Million krones  Average  annual  Ratio related 
at current prices  tax  to  income 
1959  1964  1968  59-64  ~4-68 59-68  p9-64  64-68  59-68 
26  81  112  25,5  8,4  17,6  3 ,o  0,8  1,8 
1314  1816  3354  6,7  16,6  11,0  0,8  1,5  1,1 
1340  1897  3466  .1_4  16,3  11,2  ~  ..L.2._  _1_.£ 
ii-363  7124  12770  10,3  15,7  12,7  1,2  1,4  1,3 
( 103:1)  (1483) ( 2448)  (7 ,5)  ~ 13 ,4)  ( 10 ,1)  :( 0,9  ( 1 ,2)  ( 1,1) 
(333~  (5641) 6..o322)  (11 ,1) ( 16 ,3)  ( 13 ,4)  ( 1 ,3)  ( 1 ,5)  ( 1,4) 
5703  9021  16236  ~  15,8  lr2,3  .h.!.  _l.rl_  _hL  --
2595  4415  8321  11,2  17,2  13,8  1,3  1,5  1,4 
8298  13436  24557  10,1  JL6,3  12,8  ~  1,5  ..l:.t2.. 
30701  45929  70256  8,4  11,2  9,6 
Percentage  in respect of national  income  at market 
prices 
o ,o8  0,18  0,16 
4,28  3,95  4,77 
4,36  4,13  4,93 
14,21 15,51  18 ,lB 
(3 ,36)  (3 ,23)  (3 ,49) 
( 10 ,85,) (12 ,28)  ( 14 ,69) 
18 157  19 164  23 111 
8,45  9,61  11,84 
27 103  28 160  34!95 
Source  :  National Accounts  of OECD  Cour1tries 
I  • Table  3.8  -DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  FROM  1959  TO  1969 
IN  THE  U.S.A. 
Million dollars  Average  annual  Ratio related 
at current  orices  tax  to  income 
1959  1964  1969  59-64  64-69  59-69  59-64  64-69  59-69 
Public  investments  113570  18670  25760  ,6,6  6,7  6,7  1,2  0,8  1,0 
Housing  26800  28280  38680  1,1  3,5  2,3  0,2  0,4  0,3 
Social  investments  ~0370  46950  59440  2..d  ~  .L.2_  Jh2_  ~  _Q_,2_ 
Public  consumption  88190  118562  198135  6,1  10,8  8,4  1,1  1,3  1,2 
(Military)  (46809) ( 51862)  (82126)  (2 ,1)  ( 9 ,6)  (5 ,8)  ( 0 ,4)  ( 1 ,2)  ( 0 ,9) 
(Civilian)  (41381)  (66700) Kll6oo9)  ~10 ,o)  "11 '7)  ~ 10 ,9)  ( 1 ,8)  ( 1 ,4l  ( 1 ,6) 
Social costs  128560  165512  25757~  5,2  9,2  ·7,2  0,9  1.1  1.1 
Transfers  24264  33053  59165  6,4  12,4  9,3  1,2  1,5  1,4 
Social  ex12endi ture·  ·_ :(5 2cf6 4  198565  316740  5,4  9,8  7 ,6  1,0  1,2  1.1 
Gross  national  189065  638878 
expenditure at 
943534  5,5  8,1  6,8 
market  prices 
l?ercentc:ge  in respect  of national  income  at market 
prices 
Public  investments  2,77  2,92  2,73 
Eousing  5,46  4,43  3,57 
Social  investments  8,25  7,35  6,30 
l?ublic  consumption  18,03  18,56  21,0 
(Military)  (9,57)  (8,12)  (8,70) 
(Civilian)  (8 ,46)  (10 ,44) ( 12 ,30) 
Social costs  26o28  25,91  27,30 
Transfer's  4,96  5,17  6,27 
Social  ex12enditure  31,26  31,08  33,57 
Sources  :  National Accounts  of OECD  Countries Table  3·9  DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE 
FROM  1959  TO  1969  IN  THE  U.K 
Public invest-
menta 
Housing 
Social invest-
menta 
Public  con  sump-
tion 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
Transfers 
Social ex12endi-
ture 
Gross national 
expenditure at 
market  prices 
Public invest-
mente 
Housing 
Social invest-
mente 
Public  consomp-
tion 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs 
transfers 
Social ex12en-
d:Iture 
Million Pounds St.  Average  a!Ulual  Ratio/related 
·at  curr~nt prices  liAX  to  in~nm4:. 
1959  1964  1969"  59:...64  164-69  59-69  5~-b4  b.f.--6~  59-69 
175  378  669  16,7  12,1  b-4,4  2,6  1,8  2,2 
661  1211  1839  12,9  8,7  b..o,8  2,0  1,3  1,6 
836  1589  2508  lla.1.  hl ~  2,1  1,5  1,8 
4035  5566  8li76  b,6  8,0  7,3  1,0  1,2  1,1 
(1512)  (1928)  (2267)  (5,0)  (3,3)  (4,1)  (0,8)  (0,5)  (0,6) 
(2523)  (3638)  (5909)  (7' 6)  (10, 2)  (8,9)  (1,2)  (1·, 5)  (1,3) 
4871  7155  10684  8,0  ...§.d.  8,2  1,2  hl  ~ 
1555  2257  3930  7,8  11,8  9,7  1,2  1,8  1,5 
6426  9412  14614  7,9  9,2  8,6  1,2  1,4  1,3 
23993  j287J  45174  .2.t.2  6,6  6,6 
Percentage  in respect of national income 
at market prices 
0,73  1,15  1,48 
2,75  3,68  4,07 
),48  !.&l  5,55 
16,82 l-6,93  18,10 
(6, 30) (5,86)  (5,02) 
(10, 52) (11, 07)  (13,08 
20 1JO  21 176  2J165 
6,48  6,87  8,70 
26,78  28,63  32,35 
Source  :  National Accounts  ofQECD  Countries Table  3.10  - DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  DEVELOPMENT  FROM  1959  TO  1969 
in 1Jenmark 
Million k::uones  Average  annual  Ratio related 
at current rrices  tax  to  income 
P.95~  .1964  1968  59-64 lb4-68  59-68  59-64  04-68  59-68 
Public  investments  110  206  359  13,4  15,0  15,4  1,3  1,3  1,3 
Housing  1220  2570  3995  iTo-;"1  -TI,7  14,1  1,5  0,8  1,2 
Social investments  1330  2776 
'-- 4394  15,9  12,2  14,2  .h2.  ..Q....2_  1,2 
Public  consumption  4877  9215  16456  13,6  15,6  14,5  1,3  1,1  1,2 
(1~ ili  tary)  (955)  (1790)  (2372)  (13 ,4)  (7 ,3)  ( 10 ,6)  ( 1 ,3)  ( 0 ,5)  (0,9) 
(Civilian)  (3922)  (7 425)  14084)  (13 ,6) ( 17 ,3)  ( 15 ,3)  ( 1,3)  ( 1,2)  ( 1,3) 
Social costs  6207  11991  20850  14,1  14,8  14,4  .l.d  .hL  1..s£ 
Transfers  2826  4762  10009  11,0  20,5  15,1  1,1  1,5  1,3 
Social  exEenditure  9033  16753  30859  13,2  16,5  14.6  1,3  ~  .L,2.. 
Gross  na.tional  ~8085 62)29 ~05205  1C,4  13,9  12,0  - - - expenditure  at  ---:--
market  prices 
Percentage  in respect  of national  income  at market 
prices 
Public  investments  0,29  0,33  0,38 
Housing  3,20  4,11  3,80 
Social  investments  3,49  4,44  4,18 
Public  consumption  12,81  ~4,74  ~5,64 
(Military)  (2 ,51) (2 ,86) (2 ,26) 
(Civilian)  :~ 10 ,30 )0..1 ,88 )[1.3 ,38) 
Social costs  16,30  19,18  19,82 
Transfers  7,40  7,62  9,51 
Social expenditure  23,70  26,80  ~9~33 
Source  :  National Accounts  of OECD  Countries Table  3.11  -DEVELOPMENT  IN  SOCIAL  EXPENDITURE  FROM  1959  TO  1969 
IN  J.AFAN 
Million yen  Aver~ge annual  Ratio related 
at current  rices  tax  to  income 
1959  1964  1968  59-64  64-68  59-68  59-64 64-68  59-68 
Public  investments  601  1495  2592  20,0  14,7  17,6  1,16  0,74  0,95 
Housing  575  1608  3439  22,5  21,0  22,0  1,30  1,05  1,19 
Social  investments  1176  3103  60311:  21,5  18,1  19,9  1,24  0,91  1,08 
Public  consumption  1209  2554  1921  16,2  17,8  16,9  0,94  0,89  0,91 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social costs  2385  5657  10955  18,9  18,0  18,5  1,09  0,90  1,00  ----
Transfers  517  1163  2208  17,6  17,4  12,5  1,01  0,87  0,95 
Social expenditure  2902  6820  13163  18,7  ll.L.2  18,3  1,08  0,90  ~  --
Gross national  12993  28936  60070  17,3  20.,0  18,5  - - -
expenditure  at  --
market prices 
Percentage  in respect  o:f'  national  income  at market 
prices 
Public  investments  4,62  5,16  4,32 
Housing  4,42  5,55  5,72 
Social  investments  9,04  10 171  10,04 
Public  consumption  9,30  8,82  8,20 
(Military) 
(Civilian) 
Social Costs  18 134  19 153  18 124 
Transfers  3,97  4,01  3,68 
Social  ~xpenditure  22,31  23,54  21.92 
Source  :  rrational  Accounts  of OECD  Countries 